Juridical Dimension of Discrimination

Author:Varvara Licuta Coman
Position:Danubius University of Galati, Faculty of Law
Juridical Dimension of Discrimination
Varvara Licuţa Coman
Danubius University of Galati, Faculty of Law, varvara.coman@univ-danubius.ro
Abstract: A bas ic concept of the existing political and social-juridical speech, respecting the human
rights at the European level represents one of the political fundamental s tandards of European Union,
clearly formulated by the European Council in Copenhagen i n 1993. In this respect, is well-known the
condition clause pract iced by the European Union in its economical relations with the developing states,
clause that implies the compulsoriness to res pect the human rights within these states. Together with the
equality affirmation, the non-dis crimination principle imposed itself as an essential element in the efforts
made for promoting and assuring that human rights are being respected. In essence, this principle
represents, in fact, the negative form of equality of ri ghts, reason for which they are often defined in close
connection or one by the elements of the other.
Keywords: discrimination, fundamental rights, freedom, dignity, protection
1. General considerations
We find ourselves so often in the presence of some discriminating situations that, in some cases, we
do not even observe this. Discrimination is a phenomenon impossible to remove taking into
consideration that that only in an ideal society people adapt themselves, every time and in a perfect
manner, to circumstances and people around them, without taking into account certain unjust
criteria. According to the provisions in Law no 324/2006, discrimination represents: „any
difference, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, nationality, language, religion, social
category, convictions, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, non-catching chronic diseases, AIDS,
affiliation to a non-favored category, as well as any other criterion having as purpose or effect the
restraint, elimination of recognition, usage or exercise, in equality conditions, of human rights and
of fundamental liberties or of the rights established by the law, in political, economical, social and
cultural domains or in any other domain of public life”.
In order to be able to speak about a certain action as being discriminating, the ground of the
differential treatment has to be specified first. For example, sex based discrimination is when
someone, a woman, for example, is treated differently then a man (or the other way round)1. In art.
55 of United Nations Charter (1945) it is stated that United Nations will promote human rights and
fundamental liberties for all people, “with no differentiation regarding race, sex, language or
religion”. In the Universal Statement of Human Rights, three years later, for these four grounds of
possible discrimination, another eight were added, among which: skin color, political or any other
opinion, national or social origin, ownership, birth or other statute.
Regarding the juridical domain, including a ground or not in the legislation regarding
discrimination is very important, but the analysis from a social perspective looks even further and
tries to include all types of differential treatment. From the juridical point of view, the situation is
more complicated. There are numerous examples of legal discrimination but their justification can
be always put under the question mark. Here, we refer to those situations in which people of a
certain age, “the third age citizens”, benefit of exemptions or reduced tariffs when travelling with
public transportation means or when they use public institutions or at the editors of academic
magazines who often take different subscriptions tariffs for different individuals, compared to the
institutions; there are also associations that collect different shares from people with different
income category. There are opinions that are trying to make a distinction between discrimination
1 Banton, Michael (1998). Discriminarea. Bucureşti: Editura Du Style, 1998, p. 20.

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