The contribution of military members in creating a transparent security policy: the case of Poland.

• Author: Blazhevska, Katerina Veljanovska
• Position: Report

Introduction

According to Gareth Evans (2008), one of the fathers of the rise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, there are three main challenges that need to be addressed by countries in order to successfully practice R2P for other cases. Firstly, the conceptual challenge--to ensure that the scope and limits of R2P are completely understood. Furthermore, institutional preparedness--building the capacity on international and national levels, which ensure the physical capability to undertake the range of actions needed: both prevention and reaction, diplomatic, economic, legal and military measures. Finally, political preparedness--generating strategies for indispensable political willingness will take appropriate actions if there is a threat of a next R2P situation.

In this paper, we are more interested in the last requirement--Political preparedness, especially the aspect of generating transparent security strategies and policies, supported by the military members and public, too. Of course, the focus will be given to Poland's security and defence policies and strategies.

Poland's top goal in security policy is to protect the functioning of the democratic, independent, and sovereign state, its territorial integrity, inviolability of its borders, and respect of civil rights and freedoms. By basing its policy on partnership and cooperation, Poland wants to contribute to building an enduring, just and peaceful order in Europe and throughout the world, by developing a system of cooperation founded on democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and solidarity. Poland conducts its security policy as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the European Union (EU), and by participating in political dialogue within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union and the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

In the conduct of its security policy, Poland fulfils its obligations resulting out of its membership in international organizations: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Poland makes its contribution to international cooperation through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Tarnogorski (2012) stated that membership in NATO, the EU and the strategic partnership with the United States dominates Polish foreign and defense policy. NATO's collective security pact is central to Poland's policy and is thought to require effective involvement in international operations. There is a political consensus that Poland has a responsibility to help maintain international security, especially after 11 September 2001.

The Strategy of National Security (2007) and its executive document, the Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, highlights the need of Poland to possess operational capacities that permit significant participation in NATO and EU crisis response operations, as well as support for similar UN operations. NATO and EU membership, as well as the strategic partnership with the United States, are the main reference points for Poland's foreign and defense policy.

The Strategy for the participation of the Polish armed forces in the international operations document, adopted on 13 January 2009 by the Council of Ministers, outlines the strategic aims and objectives of the Polish Armed Forces in operations abroad. Operations conducted by NATO and the EU have explicit priority, although participation in operations under the auspices of other international organizations, such as the UN and OSCE, are also mentioned. According to the Strategy, the optimal level of commitment of the Polish Armed Forces in international operations ranges between 3,200 and 3,800 soldiers and military personnel. The Polish Armed Forces can participate in missions led by international organizations or ad-hoc coalitions. Poland does not consider that the UN Security Council authorization is necessary in order to participate in operations abroad, although a UN mandate is welcome.

Another important development is The Vision of the Polish Armed Forces 2030, which outlines the future development of the Polish Army over the next two decades. It envisages Poland becoming a more reliable partner and member of the EU and NATO, which are considered crucial to Poland's national interests.

Poland is highly critical of NATO policies taking part in international missions, as it stresses, in diplomatic language, the need of finding an appropriate balance between NATO as a defence alliance, and its out-of-area missions. Practically, this means that, according to Poland, NATO should focus, most of all, on the defence of its own member states' territory, and should stop thinking of being the world's policeman. Poland currently feels neither secure, nor threatened (Centre for international relations, 2013). Nonetheless, it has a strong conviction that NATO is not the same as it used to be. Americans want Europe to take more responsibility for its own continent in a way that would allow the U.S. to focus on Asia. Europeans are unwilling and unable to build a real Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Poland's presidency in the EU Council of 2011, and its earlier efforts to reinvigorate the CSDP, ascertained that the economic crisis in the Euro zone is currently the main factor that derails any serious thinking about security policy.

Polish attitudes toward NATO missions have been divergent (Feffer, 2015). There was an initial support for the war in Iraq, but considerably less so for the war in Afghanistan. In 2009, more than three-quarters of Poles wanted their troops withdrawn from all international peacekeeping missions. In spite of the fact that 30 soldiers had died in Iraq, this war was not as controversial for the Polish public opinion as had been the war in Afghanistan, where 41 soldiers had died. Still, many Polish military and security experts concluded that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were useful for the armed forces of Poland. Polish officials, through the experiences of these expeditionary missions, gained a certain amount of capital. Even if they could imagine a worst case scenario of military crisis in East-Central Europe, this kind of interoperability has been very useful for the military.

We can conclude from the reactions of varied centres of opinion that taking part in the Iraqi operation and participation in its next phases is probably the most controversial undertaking in Polish foreign and security policy during the past 15 years. Decisions regarding the participation of Polish armed forces in both stages of the Iraqi operation, first in armed intervention and then in the stabilisation mission, came about relatively quickly and easily, contrary to the various statements of political leaders. This does not have to mean that both decisions did not relate importantly to the entirety of Polish foreign and security policy (Wagrowska, 2004:3-9).

Thus, Poland's level of defense spending and new acquisition programs reflects growing concern about the changing geostrategic environment in Central Europe. Since Poland's security strategy rests on the twin pillars of the EU and NATO, Poland has tried to increase its support in Europe as America's military presence in Europe has been diminishing. Poland's support involves expand trade with its increasing integration under the Schengen Agreement (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012:11). Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain essential to Poland's security, Poland's key ally on the Continent is currently Germany, with Polish public opinion showing a preference for Germany over the United States, for the first time, in a 2012 survey.

Poland also has nonetheless a strong military tradition, a reputation it has lived up to in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland's expeditionary missions in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have been instrumental in shaping today's Polish armed forces. Poland is by any measure the most successful case of a post-communist political and economic transition to market democracy in Europe (Michta, 2013). In addition to that, as a relatively new member to NATO, it has significantly contributed to US and NATO military missions. It is also worth noting at this point that Poland was one of the few countries, between the years 1992-2010, in which the military exceeded the revolutionary threshold (more specifically, during the years 2006-2009; see Prezelj et al. 2015), as far as the dilemma revolution-evolution is concerned.

However, more and more Polish observers notice that principle foreign and domestic policy decisions were not preceded by a satisfactory public debate, including parliamentary debate, or by a deep analysis of profits and losses about consequences from the Iraqi operation. Arguments "for" and "against" were brought up only after engagement in this action, and actually only after the first mortalities and the first political defeats.

The approach to Poland's engagement in the Iraqi mission, presented by officials during the first one and a half years of its operation, raised additional questions, not only about its legitimacy, but also about Poland's national interests for the longer term. One of these long-term concerns focuses on the security sector's reforms not having been implemented as a package in Poland, according to Gogolewska (2009). It is difficult to assess whether the security sector is integrated or not. The civil-military transformation, although parallel to other areas of democratization in Poland's political system, was driven by various specific factors, such as public awareness, the state's position in international military relations, financial support for the military sector and the role of civil society in...