The Application of the Rational Choice Theory Within the Lobbying Practice

• Author: Adriana Liuba Ahciarliu Kyriakidis
• Position: National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Institutional
• Pages: 105-110

Law, Society & Organisations

Volume III, Issue 5 (2 / 2018)

105

Adriana Liuba AHCIARLIU KYRIAKIDIS

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Institutional

THE APPLICATION OF THE RATIONAL

CHOICE THEORY WITHIN THE

LOBBYING PRACTICE

K

eywords

Decision making process,

Game theory,

Lobbying,

Rational choice theory

Abstract

The lobby activity is recognized as an action to influence the political decision making process. Lobby can

be analyzed from the perspective of the game theory, as a sub-topic of rational choice theory. According to

Neuman and Morgenstern (1953), an analysis of a game must take into account several criteria and their

interdependencies: the categories of players, their strategies, the choices made, the chosen standard of behavior

with impact probabilities and the expected results. Depending on these criteria the theory describes several

types of games which could be applied to the lobby. The purpose of this article is to show through a

comparative analysis how lobby can be described using the criteria of this political science theory.