Normative power Japan: the European Union's ideational successor or another "contradiction in terms"?

• Author: Zupancic, Rok
• Position: Report

Introduction

The decision-making process of a modern state is usually perceived as being based on the rational choices of its political leadership, summoned upon to decide what is best for the state. This sort of self-attributed wisdom implies that the policymaking process is something abstract and underhanded, prudently done within inner circles, untenable to the outsider. In modern and democratic states, this philosophy of abstractness--if not secrecy--has been overcome in recent years to some extent, bringing more openness and transparency (democratic supervision) to the realms of foreign and security policy (Grizold, 1994; Edmunds, 2000; Haltiner, 2000). Despite the prevailing image of international relations still dominated by violence and mistrust, as illustrated by the security dilemma construct, there are some facts that speak in favour of a possibility for positive change: the rise of multilateralism in dealing with transnational problems, increased ecological awareness, attempts to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals, global advocacy of human rights and international humanitarian law, and the formation of new regional orders that may foster stability in volatile regions, to mention only a few (Malesic, 1998; Vuga, 2010; Prebilic and Gustin, 2010; Bojinovic Fenko, 2012; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2012).

These positive and negative aspects of the 'Janus-faced international relations' are evident in East Asia, too. This is particularly valid for Japan, which is, on the one hand, tempted to play a pivotal role as an honest broker in the international community, with its due contribution to "the global good" (thereby striving to be recognized as 'an international force of good' or, paraphrasing Manners (2002), as 'normative power Japan'). On the other hand, Japan also experiences severe difficulties in achieving that, due to a combination of internal and external circumstances--such as its lack of resources and the aggressive behaviour of certain states in the region (Katada et al., 2004; Hook et al., 2001). Quite substantial scientific research has been done on the foreign and security policy of Japan and the factors influencing it (for example, Inoguchi and Jain (2000), Green (2001), Kawashima (2005), Samuels (2007), Shuichi (2010), Sunohara (2010), Howe (2010), Soeya et al. 2011, lokibe (2011)). In this regard, there is an evident increase in scholarship analysing the concept of normative power. At the same time, it should be noted that the bulk of it was written by authors, either analysing the EU's quest for normative power and its limitations (Manners, 2002 and 2006; Diez, 2004 and 2013; Balducci, 2010; Kavalski, 2013), attempts of particular countries to become recognized as 'forces of good' (Brommerson, 2010; Crawford 2010; Zupancic and Udovic, 2011; Kavalski, 2013) or the concept of state normative power in general (Koivisto, 2012). Since Japan has strived to be perceived as 'a source of good' in the world for most of the post-1945 period--and therefore developed a deliberate policy in that respect--it comes as a surprise that the analyses of ethical and normative aspects of its foreign and security policy are rare. (3) This article attempts to fill this void to some extent.

The central research question of this paper is: how has Japan been trying to reinforce its normative power in such a way that the strategic interests of other influential actors in international community are not directly challenged? The paper will identify how the activities contributing to the image of Japan as a normative power have been streamlined through fields, which could be traditionally categorized within the so called security-related domains: peace-building (and peace-brokering), promotion of the concept of human security, and relying on regional initiatives (the case of anti-piracy initiative in Asia ReCAAP will be analysed in more detail). The paper argues that Japan, although struggling with economic and financial crisis, continues investing a significant amount of resources in building up its normative power. In other words, with the help of non-normative means (economic and financial investment) aimed at security-related domains, Japan has been trying to become known as 'an international source of good', which has, following Manners's argument (2002), the 'ability to shape conceptions of the normal' in the international community, while at the same benefiting in terms of its own national security.

To prove these arguments, this paper first aims to elaborate how the concept of normative power--as an emerging factor which has gained prominent attention in contemporary security and IR studies--could be understood, and how it is related to the other types of power (hard and soft power). Stemming from these theoretical insights this paper, secondly, discusses what are the core principles and actions influencing an international actor seeking to become "a normative power advocate", and how could such an actor effectively make use of investing economic means to raise its normative power? Thirdly, and lastly, the article analyses how Japan, as an influential country with the potential for great leverage in shaping the international system, realized that becoming a source of normative power could be an important trump card in its security and foreign policy-making, which could help it cope with its recent unfavourable circumstances in adapting to the international order. (4) In this regard, three areas used by Japan as platforms for reinforcing its normative power are analysed: peace building (with peace-brokering), promotion of human security, and relying on regional initiatives (the case of ReCAAP).

Normative power as means of state policy: an emerging factor in foreign and security policy analysis

Few would disagree with the argument that the world's security environment has changed significantly after the Cold War. Since the process of change is unceasing, foreign and security policies of states are in constant need of adapting to new realities, especially because transnational and interdependent challenges are on the rise (Malesic and Jelusicova, 2003; Weiss, 2010; Udovic, 2011; Prezelj et al., 2012; Eman et al., 2013). A review of literature shows that there are plenty of scientific and professional journals which analyse foreign and security policies of specific states, whilst others focus on defence policies at the core of state security; (5) all three 'subfields' of states' policy are intertwined to an extent that it is almost impossible to isolate and analyse them individually. One may conclude that if all the analyses are focused on the same realm, there should be at least some sort of common denominator or agreement on what constitutes the analysed realms. This is, however, not the case, as these analyses differ to a great extent. (6)

Among the factors influencing foreign and security policies of certain countries the following are usually discussed: 1) position of a country in the region and the international community in general (characteristics of its geopolitical environment); 2) the role of international organizations (joining alliances, "socialization" of a country etc.); 3) specific "security incidents" and trends in its vicinity and in the international security environment in general; 4) the role of 'knowledge and ideas' (think tanks, research associations, media); 5) the role of civil society. In addition, there is another factor, which does not fit into any of the five groups, and consequently, cannot be categorized as a distinctive group. International norms, our research suggests, act as a factor that simultaneously pervades, but is independent from the remaining factors. Consequently, it is implicitly or explicitly present in all of the five groups, becoming a cohesive element that binds together and influences all the other factors. (7) Being perceived by the other actors as a subject who highly respects the norms or even spread them may, however, be an important means of the subject to 'shape the conception of normal' in the international arena.

The discourse on the (role of) norms, their diffusion and impact was brought to the theory of international relations mostly by constructivist theorists. (8) Nonetheless, a certain ambiguity exists among theorists with regards to its definition and interplay with normative power. Acknowledging the wealth of theoretical contributions made in this respect, we do not engage critically with the nature of norms. For the purpose of this article we thus follow the definition advanced by Krasner (1982), which states that norms are "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations." Two decades later, accordingly to the aforementioned definition, Manners (2002: 239) follows this logic by arguing that a normative power actor has an "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations". The arguments of Bjorkdahl (2007) shed some more light to the understanding of norms/normative powers and do not contradict previously mentioned definitions, arguing that "the construction and promotion of norms is a strategy for setting international normative standards and thereby influencing the world order". A further elaborated argument is put forward by Kavalski (2013: 248), arguing that normative power is not necessarily about affecting the perceptions of other actors, but mostly about framing the responses of those actors.

The latter argument is important for this article due to the fact that it implies a relational logic of normative power. Thus, normative power is more than a rather vague notion that someone is "doing good". This 'good' should also be recognized and, consequently, accepted as 'good' by the other. The concept of normative power then tends to rest on the assumption that there are cosmopolitan norms and values that transcend the particularistic claims of discrete political communities. Such an...