Lilliputian in a Goliath world: the preventive diplomacy of Slovenia in solving the question of Kosovo's independence.

• Author: Zupancic, Rok

Introduction

According to the theory of small states in international relations, small states do not have as many means to achieve their foreign policy goals as larger states have (Morgenthau, 1948/2004: 97; Keohane, 1969; Benwell, 2011). However, there are certain niches that can be filled up by small states, since they have certain comparative advantages to larger states (see for example Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen, 2006; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). Due to certain rules and procedures in modern international relations, an important foreign policy task can be assigned to a small state. On one side, an important role can arise from the state's own ambitions to 'become' an important and credible actor in the international community (e.g. with candidature for a presidency of certain international organization), or on the other hand, such a role may arise from unexpected events in the international community (e. g. when an armed conflict breaks out in vicinity of the state, certain actors in the international community may ask the state to take certain measures regarding the conflict).

Slovenia, a country which by most of the definitions falls in the category of small states (Grizold and Vegic, 2001; Bucar and Sterbenc, 2002; Sabic, 2002; Brglez, 2005; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2007), took over the presidency of the EU Council on the 1st January 2008, as the first new member state of the EU. Within this period it has been assigned an important role of chairing the work of all the configurations of the EU Council and representing the institution in the international community.

Slovenia, which has in its brief history as an independent nation already performed some demanding foreign policy tasks (UN Security Council presidency in 1998/99; OSCE chairmanship in 2005), faced not only the challenge of the EU presidency per se, but also one of the major (geo)political challenges of that time--when Slovenia took over the presidency, Kosovo was in final preparations to declare independence from Serbia. Planned proclamation of independence triggered harsh responses in Serbia and according to some analysts (Krstic, 2007; Janjic, 2007; Matic, 2007;

Sesternina, 2007) and media reports (B92, 2007; HINA, 2007), there was a substantial chance that the declaration of independence may renew armed conflict between Kosovars and Serbs. The worst case scenario was that a renewal of armed conflict in Kosovo would eventually cause a spill-over effect, which could lead into violence in the wider region (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania). Acknowledging that the EU perceives countries of the Western Balkans as natural parts of the EU, and consequently sees them as potential members of the EU in the near future (see for example EurActiv, 2009; Barroso, 2011), avoiding possible instabilities was necessary and it was clear that Slovenia, as the presiding member of the EU Council, was entitled to take appropriate measures to mitigate the tense situation in the neighbourhood.

Regardless of later developments, we argue that Slovenia, as a small state, was in the most crucial period, a coherent and honest broker between both sides in the Kosovo conflict. Slovenia was, because of its past ties with the region and its knowledge of national character particularities (Raskovic and Svetlicic 2011; Udovic 2011), able to conduct a stable and unbiased policy towards both nations involved in the Kosovo conflict. Its power of 'balance' sprang from its (positive) reputation in the region; firstly it was the first state from the region to join the EU, secondly it was the presiding member state of the EU, and thirdly, its role and behaviour during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the wars that followed was relatively untarnished (Prebilic and Gustin, 2011). Both facts gave it a higher manoeuvre place, because on the one hand it was able to cope with particularities of national character of negotiators from Kosovo and Serbia, while on the other hand it remained calm and was not a priori in favour of anyone, retaining good relations with both countries. (4)

In the article we are trying to answer three questions. The first focuses on how Slovenia had, as a small country, by using the preventive diplomacy approach in the time of its presidency of the EU Council, tried to keep political and security status quo in the Western Balkans (in the crucial period of the preparations of Kosovo to declare its independence). The second clarifies the activities of the Slovenian EU Council presidency for preventing Kosovar authorities to declare independence in a way that would be uncoordinated with other relevant international actors in Kosovo (esp. the EU member states and the USA), since uncoordinated actions by Kosovar authorities could have led to a renewal of violence in Kosovo and the wider region and on the other hand, how had Slovenia, in coordination with the EU, tried to appease Serbia to an extent that Serbian authorities did not resort to certain activities that could have triggered violence? And third, deriving from the analysis and using the method of induction, we are trying to clarify what the role of a small state can be--holding an important foreign policy position--in preventive diplomacy activities, if the interests of large states are high.

The methodological framework of the article is based on two mutually intertwined research methods: first, on the analysis of activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia vis-a-vis Kosovo through press releases, interviews and official speeches; (5) and second, on the interviews conducted by the authors of this paper with high ranking diplomats of the Republic of Slovenia, who have been engaged in preventive diplomacy vis-a-vis Kosovo and/or the EU at that time. (6) At this point we have to explain that the selection of interviewees can be seen as 'biased', because we have selected only Slovene government officials, but we argue that if we would like to analyse the preventive diplomacy of Slovenia in the Kosovo conflict, we have to focus on Slovene activities, which is best known precisely by Slovene government officials.

This analysis is relevant for at least three reasons. Firstly, preventive diplomacy has become one of the most important raisons d'etre of various international organizations (with the EU as one of the main promoters of preventive diplomacy see for example Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004; Mason and Meernik, 2006; Zupancic, 2010), as well as of certain countries (e. g. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Canada); small states, becoming aware of their comparative advantages in that respect, are joining this multilateral efforts to avert bloodshed, so it is crucial to analyse experiences and learn from good practices/missed opportunities. Secondly, the lack of scientific and expert literature analysing how a small state can act as an important player in conflict prevention, is evident. Namely, the experts on conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy (e. g. Smith, 1995; Lund, 1996; Cahill, 2000; Carment and Schnabel, 2004; Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004; Steiner, 2004; Mason and Meernik, 2006; Ramcharan, 2008) emphasize the role of large states and/or international organizations with regard to conflict prevention, and at the same time omit a possible role of small countries in that respect--the findings of this research can, with a help of the inductive method, bring certain conclusions for a general theory of small states in international relations. And finally, a thorough analysis of the activities of the international community in the case of Kosovo and the processes that are taking place in the region is needed, because Kosovo (and the whole region of the Western Balkans) is likely to remain a trouble spot from a security viewpoint for at least the next few years.

The article consists of five sections. In the introductory section goals of the article its methodological framework and relevancy are described. The next section analyses the role of preventive diplomacy in the wider context of conflict prevention. The subsequent section discusses the (possible) role of small states in the framework of preventive diplomacy. The fourth section is the core of analysis: it focuses on the diplomatic activities of Slovenia towards Kosovo from the 1st July 2007 till the 31st March 2010. The final section presents some general conclusions and provides reflection on the opportunities for engagement of small states in preventive diplomacy.

Preventive diplomacy (within the framework of conflict prevention) Preventive diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. We are reminded of this by Broderick (1924, 74) who said that "the function of a diplomat is to keep the peace and solve conflicts that could threaten the peace". Nowadays the meaning of the concept of preventive diplomacy has broadened, which is why it is necessary to first conceptualise it for the purposes of this article.

The broadest concept linked to preventive diplomacy is (the idea and practice of) conflict prevention. It would be more accurate to use the terminus technicus 'the prevention of armed conflicts', as some (small) parts of the scientific community argue. Namely, not all conflicts should be prevented, since some of them could trigger positive (transformative) changes. What should be prevented are the conflicts with violent characteristics, which could turn into armed conflicts. However, the majority of English-speaking experts (see for example Lund, 1996; Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004; Mason and Meernik, 2006) and Russian-speaking experts (see for example Yurgens, Dynkin and Baranovsky, 2009; Antonenko, 2011) in the field, whose 'scientific voice' is much stronger due to the wider use of these two languages, mostly use the term 'conflict prevention'. (7)

Thus, in accordance with the wide-ranging definition, conflict prevention is defined as any political, military or economic...