Lessons from a divided society: how to deal with party factionalism.

• Author: Ionascu, Alexandra
• Position: POLSCI PAPERS - Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania - Report

Political parties in new democracies underwent a process of institutionalisation and organisational adaptation. Despite their recent formation, these actors do present similar features with their Western counterparts, preserving at the same time sui generis types of behaviour (Van Biezen 2003, 2004). Weak structures of membership and centralised patterns of decisionmaking and dependence on the state resources seem to summarize their main organisational features. Acting as public utilities (Kopecky & van Biezen 2007) and not as chains of representation, the post-communist party organisations were guided by rent-seeking practices and party colonisation of the state (Kopecky 2006).

In a general context of organisational frailty, one notable exception can be identified: the ethnic based parties. Illustrating the divided ethnic composition of the post-communist societies, which resulted in the emergence of an enduring ethnic cleavage, the ethnic parties presented a rather unique trajectory in what concerns their electoral success (Lewis 2001). In the beginning of the 90s their electoral achievements were mainly linked to an initial function: defending ethnic minority interests and acting "as vehicles for seeking redress of particular grievances generated by communist minorities policy" (Millard, 2004: 235). However, in some cases, their continuity on the political scene during the last 20 years, sometimes as key governmental players, suggests the existence of atypical strategies for organisational survival and interest representation. Parties such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria or until recently, the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia (until 2010) constituted one of the main players of the post-communist politics. This also seems to be the case of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR).

The lack of politicised social stratification, the weak programmatic parties (Van Biezen 2003, Kitschelt 2000) describing all the countries in the region, did not block in the Romanian case the articulation of a tension between a nationalistic and antinationalistic discourse (Gallagher 1995, Mungiu 2002, Preda 2003, Preda & Soare 2008, De Waele 2002, 2004). Reflecting a long historical tradition, fuelled by the heritages of the Ceausescu's era of high centralisation and forceful homogenisation of ethnic divisions, the post-communist nationalism has been used as a "substitute for social integration" and mobilised by the successor party's representatives as means of blocking the creation of an autonomous space necessary for genuine pluralism (Gallagher 1996:221-222, see also Chen 2003). In the beginning of the 90s, the "ex-communist apparatchiks" promoted radical claims transforming the ethnic minorities into scapegoats (Gallagher 1995, Tismaneanu 1998:41). The unusual strategy of radical populist movements' cooption into the governmental arena applied during 1992-1996 (Mudde 2002:224), allowed the political promotion of parties which combined both nationalism and socialism claims. This also constituted an important weapon in the hands of ex-communist political elites ensuring their electoral endurance (Mungiu 2010:66). Stimulated by poverty, the erosion of confidence in the institutions as well as by parochial structures of the post-communist society, the Romanian nationalism constituted an important gridlock in the democratisation process (Mungiu 2002).

Paradoxically, the salience of the minority issue proved to be quite beneficial for DAHR's internal cohesion and survival on the political scene (Millard 2004: 238-9). Representing the main minority of the country, approximately one million and a half of Hungarians (6.6% of the whole population), DAHR preserved a score gravitating around the share of the Hungarian population (Horvath 2005a:143-67), exhibiting an important capacity of mobilising the ethnic vote concentrated in the Transylvanian counties (mostly in Cluj, Covasna, Harghita and Salaj) (Horvath 2005b:233). As a result, the Alliance became the only political organisation of the Romanian post-communist era which succeeded to pass all electoral tests without concluding any pre-electoral agreements. Starting with 1996, the decision to integrate the DAHR in the governmental coalitions, even when the DAHR ministers were not essential for governmental survival (Gallagher 2001:395), improved the minority participation in the decision making process and diminished the ethnic clashes (Stan 2010: 386). Given the constant parliamentary representation, during the past 20 years, the DAHR acquired a pivotal role on the political scene by participating in the governing coalitions in 1996-2000 and 2004-2011, but also by supporting the government in 2000-2004. This radical change in the political perception of the Alliance allowed DAHR to fully benefit from its coalition and blackmail potentials in backing some important reforms concerning the minority rights (Roper 1997:83).

The key role played by DAHR in determining the parliamentary majorities was doubled by an exceptional organisational continuity and external cohesion. Since its creation in 1990, the party had to deal with "a conflict ridden factions game" between outward-looking factions which pushed towards the creation of a separate political entity in Transylvania region and the inward-looking factions which were more inclined towards demanding general measures of decentralisation and cooperating with the government (Roger 2002: 27,34). The DAHR political representation in executive portfolios was considered one of the success stories of the transition process as far as dealing with the ethnic problems is concerned (Mungiu 2010:69). This measure impacted not only on the statute of the ethnic party on the political scene, but also it imposed a change in the internal balance of power, consolidating the predominance of DAHR moderate elites (Mungiu 2002:207). As a result, the Alliance succeeded to preserve its image as the sole representative of Hungarian minority rights. Neither the eclectic character of the organisation based on different interests and ideological platforms, nor the surfacing of a contender beginning with 2003 (when some party elites left the Alliance and decided to run in the elections on independent lists, subsequently forming in 2008 a new party crystallised around extremist proponents: Hungarian Citizens' Party (MPP)) did not alter the minority ethnic party's unity or its electoral support which remained quite strong (Stroschein 2011: 198).

Consequently, the continuity of DAHR on the electoral scene and its constant presence near the apex of power constitutes an exceptional trajectory in a general context of political instability. As in the case of other ethnic parties, a myriad of systemic factors such as the nature of the electoral system or the format of the party system (the degree of fragmentation) contributed to the survival of DAHR (Szasz 2003). Although its persistence over the last two decades on the electoral scene can be explained by its single issue dimension or the institutional framework, one cannot ignore that the survival of this party is also linked with the organisational arrangements and mechanisms dealing with the salient issue of party factionalism. Considering the organisational adaptation of DAHR as an example of accommodation to the post-communist realities and its environmental challenges, the present article aims to examine DAHR's internal structure, seeking to identify its main organisational arrangements as means of preventing the emergence of party splits.

The study of DAHR's organisational features will be based both on the Alliance statutory arrangements and the elites' trajectories and representations. The analysis of the party representatives' attitudes (central and local leaders) will be based on a selected set of questions extracted from a survey conducted during the DAHR's 8th ordinary Congress held on the 2nd and 3rd of March 2007 in Arad. The survey is a part of a broader research focus on party organisations developed within the Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (Cevipol, l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles) and it is integrating a research project on party delegates in East-Central Europe (coordinated by prof. J.M. De Waele). The questions were based on a standardised Cevipol questionnaire (2) which was distributed immediately after the delegates' registration and filled in during the Congress session. The identity of the respondents remained anonymous. The return rate was of 190 valid responses, meaning 39,7% of the total number of delegates who were present during the voting procedures for the President of the party. In what follows, the analysis of DAHR's anatomy is conducted along three dimensions. The first part of the study will embrace an institutional perspective, analysing the party through its statutory measures seen as procedural means of coping with internal conflicts. The second part will investigate the party leaders' opinions regarding the internal functioning of the Alliance aiming at identifying the elites' support for the organisational functioning. Finally, the last part of this study aims at mirroring the general images depicted in the first two sections with the outcomes of the recruitment procedures, particularly in what concerns the external representation of the Alliance in public offices.

The ethnic parties and the organisational dimension

The analysis of the ethnic minorities' representation on the political scene unveils a widespread polysemy: ethno-regional parties (Tursan, 1998, De Winter 1998), ethno-political movements (Esman 1994), or ethnic parties (Horowitz 1985:293) etc. The numerous references to the proper name to be given to these organisations do not alter the teleological nature of their definition. Their main attribute is consistent with their ultimate scope: the interest towards a representation of a particular ethnic minority...