Export cartels - a century of fumble attitudes?

• Author: Cristina Gonta
• Position: Assistant Lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights
• Pages: 1-32

1

EXPORT CARTELS – A CENTURY OF FUMBLE ATTITUDES?

Cristina Gonta

1)

Republic of Moldova

Assistant Lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

The present article analyzes, from a historical perspective, the debate

concerning the export cartel debate from its birth in 1918 until today. There can

be identified four different periods of the debate that revolve around the

enactment of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the creation of the Bretton Woods

institutions, the creation of the World Trade Organization and the July package

decision of 1 July 2004. The article highlights the actors and the ideas that

shaped the debate and the results that were obtained. While it is clear that the

fairest solution to the issue of export cartels would be the prohibition of this

practice, what is not clear is the path that would lead to the ban and the

institutional framework that would support it afterwards. This paper thus

proposes an approach for identifying the most affordable solution. It argues

however that, before launching an institutionalized solution on export cartels,

more in depths analysis is needed

2)

.

Keywords: export cartels; World Trade Organization; competition law; cartels

INTRODUCTION

1. In a global world some issues become, inevitably, more visible. One such

issue is the practice of providing exemptions from national competition legislation

to firms that cooperate in their export activities, known also as the export cartel

exemption.

2. The export cartels are “mysterious” cartels. While international cartels

received and continue receiving attention both from the national authorities and

from the International Organizations (IGOs), export cartels remain almost

unobserved. This paper presents the evolution of the export cartels debate that

began in 1918 with the enactment in the US of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the main

actors and ideas that shaped the debate, and the achieved results. The paper also

1)

Cristina Gonta (Republic of Moldova) is a n Assistant Lawyer at the European Court of

Human Rights and a PhD student at the Univer sity of Bern. This paper represents the personal

opinions of the author and does not engage in any way the responbilit y of the author’s employer.

Article published in the journal “Law” nr. 11/2010, pp. 326–355.

2)

The present paper is the result of a research carried out during a LLM pr ogram under the

supervision of Thomas Cottier, Professor at the University of Bern.

2

attempts to emit some general conclusions concerning the evolution of trade

relations and trade law thinking that accompanied the export cartels debate.

The paper is divided into four parts which present the waves of academic

thinking on export cartels. The first part depicts the first years of the 20

th

century.

The second part highlights the evolution of the export cartel debate after the

World War II (WWII). The third part follows the development of the export cartel

debate after the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The last part

focuses on the very recent works on export cartels that were published after the

failure of the trade and competition debate within the WTO. A special emphasis

will be placed in the last part of the present dissertation on the feasible solutions

for the export cartel issue.

I. THE WEB-POMERENE MOMENTUM

The legal writing on trade and competition is not a recent invention. The

survey of the early literature on export cartels surprises with the amount, the

quality and the depth of the legal thinking at the beginning of the 20

th

century.

In relation to the enactment of the Webb-Pomerene Act, it is interesting to

highlight, from the point of view of the modern lawyer, the reasons for the

adoption of such legislation, the advantages and disadvantages of enacting such

legislation and some of the specific questions asked by the academics who first

considered this issue.

The Webb-Pomerene Act (WPA) was adopted in 1918. The Act was designed

to promote the American export trade by granting relief from the Sherman Act

provisions to the so-called export associations.

Since a proper balance must have been struck between a provision that would

have de facto repealed the Sherman Act and a provision that would have given the

American exporters what they required, the reasons for enacting such legislation

were carefully considered.

One could identify four main reasons that lead to the adoption of the Webb-

Pomerene Act.

a) An eye for an eye, a cartel for a cartel

Export associations were considered a legal answer to a late business start. In

order to compete with the already established and very powerful German

3)

,

British, Dutch or Japanese “combinations”, the small American business needed

to be empowered with a necessary business wisdom, the wisdom of association

4)

.

Since all the leading trade nations of those times allowed associations for the

3)

Steven B. Webb, ‘Tariffs, Cartels, Technology and Growth in the Germa n Steel Industry,

1879 to 1914’ (1980) 40 The Journal Of Economic History 2, 309 -330.

4)

Eliot Jones, ‘The Webb-Pomerene Act’ (1920) 28 The Journal Of Political Economy 9, 754.

3

promotion of exports, the American exporters saw the Sherman Act, which did

not provide for such an exemption, as a betrayal. As Kirsh observed, “a more

tolerant attitude than that evidenced by the American anti-trust policy is

manifested by all of the governments of foreign nations. There are at present in no

European country restrictive legal provisions which embody the regulations and

contain the drastic penalties of the American anti-trust laws”

5)

.

The export association legislation was, on the other hand, a general policy

choice. Canadian trade officials and the British Board of Trade – that historically

and culturally praised individualism and condemned monopolist tendencies –

strongly supported export association legislation

6)

.

Finally, the export associations were needed to respond to the European

combinations of buyers that had the effect of lowering the price of the exported

American goods

7)

.

In the light of these arguments it appears that the Webb-Pomerene Act was, at

the time of its adoption, a necessary law.

b) Solving a bigger puzzle

The Webb-Pomerene Act represented only one piece of a larger policy which

endeavored to promote U.S. foreign trade. The inadequate banking and credit

facilities abroad, the discrimination against the American goods by foreign

steamship lines, the small amount of American investment in the securities of

foreign companies and the comparative inexperience

8)

of American business

society needed to be compensated by strong incentives to export and to invest.

One such incentive was granted by the WPA aimed to lower the export costs, to

secure better credit information and thus better financing of the business and to

allow an exchange of know-how between the members of the association.

The Shipping Board Act, the Edge Act, the Merchant Marine Act were part of

the same logic, providing exemptions from the anti-trust laws and making

available new financial means for foreign trade promotion

9)

.

c) Stop competing with each other!

One could also identify an unconventional reason for the adoption of the

WPA: the intention to make the American exporters stop competing with each

other in the foreign markets. This idea is highlighted by Eliot who noted that the

elimination of competition between the American firms will lead to better prices

5)

Benj amin S. Kirsh, ‘For eign Trade Functions of Trade Associations: The Legal Aspects’

(1928) 76 University Of Pennsilvania Law Review 8, 894.

6)

William Notz, ‘Cartels During the War’ (1919) 27 The Journal Of Po litical Economy 1, 6-7

7)

Jones (1920), 757.

8)

Ibid., 757.

9)

Kirsh (1928), 913.

4

for the products sold abroad

10)

. In the same sense, another author wrote “that it is

not the economies of combination that attract Webb-Pomerene association

activities. Rather it is the opportunity to lessen competitive rivalry, ostensibly in

foreign markets”

11)

. In this way what was supposed to act as an incentive to export

became in fact an incentive to cartelize.

The biggest amount of information available about export associations relates

to the advantages and disadvantages that such legislation exhibits. Two

observations should be made at this point. First, it appears that the only absolute

supporter of the export association legislation was the Federal Trade Commission.

Except of the FTC, few authors voiced unconditional support for the WPA.

Second, the number of critics surpassed from the beginning the number of the

WPA supporters.

In a report issued in 1927, the Federal Trade Commission enumerated the

advantages of the export trade associations: (1) reduction of the selling and

transport costs; (2) standardization of business practices; (3) improvement of

product quality; (4) elimination of the cut-throat competition in the foreign

markets; (5) economy in operation; (6) better distribution systems; (7) prorating of

business data collection

12)

.

One of the few supporters of the Webb statute concluded in 1929 that the

WPA “has provided thus far a serviceable piece of legislation and within

reasonable bounds accomplished what its name proclaims: An Act to Promote

Export Trade”

13)

.

On the side of academics who voiced rather skeptical views, two main types

of criticism can be identified in relation to the implementation of the WPA: (a)

egotistic criticism and (b) altruistic criticism.

a. Egotistic criticisms

“The chief objection to the export associations authorized by the Webb Act is

that they may be used as a means of restricting competition in the domestic

market”

14)

. As Fournier explains, the idea that domestic market and foreign

markets are separate is “entirely erroneous” since “the two markets cannot be kept

distinct and separate without restraint of competition in both markets”

15)

.

Taken into account the intensive international cartel activity before the WWI,

many authors expressed the view that the removal of the Sherman Act restrictions

10)

Jones (1920), 757.

11)

Leslie T. Fournier, ‘The Purpose and Results of the Webb -Pomerene Law’ ( 1932) 22 The

American Economic Review 1, 20.

12)

Anual Report Of Federal Trade Commission for year ending June, 1927 , paragraph 23.

13)

William Notz, ‘Ten Years’ Operation o f the Webb Law’ (1929) 19 The American

Economic Review 1, 19.

14)

Jones (1920), 765.

15)

Fournier (1932), 26.

5

as regards the export trade associations will lead to the proliferation of

international cartels

16)

.

Another fear expressed by the academia was that the “a cartel for a cartel”

approach might be just the beginning of a trade war. The Webb statute may create

a reaction on the side of the foreign competitors that could seek to expand the

already existing cartels in order to react to the newly empowered American

business

17)

.

Fournier pointed out that the Webb-Pomerene Act was very likely to create

“serious administrative difficulties”, by placing on the Department of Justice a

heavier burden of proof as to the domestic restraint on trade.

b. Altruistic criticisms

One of the most astonishing and prophetical criticism expressed in relation to

the WPA at the beginning of the last century was the so-called “world consumers

issue”

18)

. Fournier noted that the Webb bill and its future interpretations represent

a “vehicle for the oppression of foreign people”, proposing already in the 1920s

what today would be classified under the name of accountability.

Jones noted that, except of a trade war, “the pursuit of trade by large groups

will tend to upset once more the peace of the world”

19)

. In the same way Notz,

while highlighting the “dangerous effects of commercial friction upon the political

relations among nations”, suggests that the only healthy way in which trade could

be pursued in the future is to “give to commerce the humane imprint which shall

always constitute the emblem of genuine civilization and enlightenment”

20)

.

In sum, the WPA was the first concrete attempt to establish a policy on export

associations. The Act was part of the US competition policy, and a step ahead

towards the crystallization of an American trade policy.

The WPA was an expression of a political wisdom. No special legal necessity

or economic reasoning seemed to require this amendment to the Sherman Act.

The fact that Woodrow Wilson himself intervened two times to ask the Congress

to speed up the process of adoption of an export association bill points out to the

weight that the political, rather than the legal or economic, interests played in the

adoption of this law.

Furthermore, it appears that the initial commentators of the WPA were more

concerned with its political impact rather than with its legal impact. Thus the

debate whether cartels ensure peace by guaranteeing that competitors will not

intervene in each others’ markets or, on contrary, may lead to a war by developing

16)

William Notz, ‘International Private Agreements in the Fo rm of Cartels, Syndicates, and

Other Combinations’ (1920) 28 The Journal Of Political Economy 8, 667-671.

17)

Jones (1920), 766.

18)

Fournier (1932), 19.

19)

Jones (1920), 766.

20)

Notz (1919), 45.

6

an ill-feeling among nations prevailed in the American academia. In fact, the

export association legislation was seen against the peace time-war time

background. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles – which was a peace-making

treaty – obliged Germany “to protect the trade of the Allies against unfair

competition” is symptomatic of the tendency in the policy making process of that

time to balance out the benefits from trade with the possible damages to the world

peace. This leads inevitably to the idea that the export association legislation was

perceived as political necessity in the first instance, the economic and legal

reasoning on efficiencies or enforcement was absent or only at the periphery of

the academic interest.

Also, one could assume that the WPA was an important component of the

American endeavor to quit its isolationist instincts. The increase of trade officials,

the amendment of banking laws and the campaigns for “building up among the

people of the United States an appreciation of the significance of international

trade”

21)

lead to the conclusion that trade was perceived as a great opportunity for

the American business to meet the outside world. The Webb law was only one of

the incentives to do so and, as such, part of a systemic change.

One should also mention the prophetic talent of the academic debate revolving

around the Webb bill. The references to the “world consumers”, the expressed need

for an international mechanism to prevent unfair competition, and the enforcement

problems are questions that challenge the minds and the personal philosophy of

modern lawyers and economists, just as they did almost one century ago.

Lastly, one could affirm that the Webb Act was a legal text issued from a

realistic reasoning, but which had an idealistic bias. On the one hand, the purpose

of the act was clearly to empower the small American businesses to compete with

foreign players. On the other hand, the wording “export association” (instead of

“export cartel”) tends to put the same behaviour – cartelization for the purpose of

dividing markets, imposing prices or building barriers to entry – in a more

favorable light, thus leading to the conclusion that the initiators of the Act

believed, out of an idealistic inrush, that export associations will represent a sort

of higher good.

II. THE BRETTON WOODS MOMENTUM

1. (Big) Politics that Shaped (Small) Policies

The WWII left behind a politically, economically and legally “depressed”

world. That is why any attempt to explain policy choices of that era should be

followed by this vision of a politically, economically and legally “depressed” world.

21)

Chauncey D. Snow, ‘American Foreign Trade Problems’ (1924) 14 The American Economic

Review 1, 7.

7

While the main concern after the WWI was to restore peace, the main concern

after the WWII was to maintain peace. Also, while peace after the WWI meant

mainly security of borders, peace after WWII meant well-being of everyone. The

commercial policy features of the treaties ending the WWI were minimal and the

attempts to develop trade relationships after the WWI were loose

22)

. This was not

the case after the WWII, when trade was affirmed not only as one of the pillars of

international relations, but also as guardian of the world peace. That is why the

post-war vision as achieved at Bretton Woods in 1944 entailed that the future

economic structure shall include the International Monetary Fund, the

International Bank for Development and Reconstruction and the International

Trade Organization (ITO). Even if the ITO never came into being, the fact that a

trade organization was placed on the Bretton Woods agenda proves that trade was

considered as one of the future pieces in the international relations game. What is

more, the agreement to cut tariffs and make other concessions represented “a

dramatic break from earlier ‘mercantilist’ approach to trade and was intended to

inaugurate a new era of open commerce”

23)

.

One might say that the founders of the Bretton Woods system adopted a

“maximal” approach to trade. As the Havana Charter suggests, trade relations

were supposed to bring about not only the reduction of tariffs (which would

account for the “minimal” approach to trade), but more broadly employment, non-

discrimination and higher volume of income. In this sense, the Havana Charter

contained provisions not only concerning tariffs and quantitative restrictions –

which represent the core of any trade policy – but also provisions on subsidies,

commodity agreements, employment and restrictive business practices.

In the context of the “maximal” approach to trade, the debate on the

restrictive business practices was an important one, both for policy-makers and for

scholars. In this sense, the Havana Charter stipulated that:

Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall co-operate with the

Organization to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises,

business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit

access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have

harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade

24)

.

The practices targeted by the Havana Charter included inter alia:

22)

Charles Kindleberg, ‘Commercial P olicy between the Wars’ in Peter Mathias and Sidney

Pollard (eds) The Cambridge Ec onomic History of Europe (1989) Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 161- 196; Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin and Gianni Tonniolo, ‘The Legacy

of the First War’ in The European Economy between the Wars (1997 ) Oxford: OUP, 18-37.

23)

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (2005) New York: Penguin Books, 107.

24)

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, 24 March, 1948, U. N Doc./E

C.2/78, reprinted in Dep’t St., Pub. No. 3206, Commercial P olicy Series 114, 86-87 (1948)

(hereinafter ‘Havana Charter’), Article 46.

8

(a) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others in

the purchase, sale or lease of any product;

(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial market

or field of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas or

purchase quotas;

(c) discriminating against particular enterprises;

(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas.

The Havana Charter provided for a consultation procedure, an investigation

procedure and special procedures with respect to services for the remedial of a

situation that potentially affects international trade by restricting competition,

limiting access to markets and fostering monopolistic control. If consultations

could not resolve the problem, than all the Members sitting in the Conference had

the opportunity to refer the issue to the UN executive board for further review.

The International Court of Justice could review the decisions taken by the

Conference

25)

.

As a later account pointed out, implicit in the Havana Charter was “the idea

that government actions in the domestic market can affect the international

movement of goods, capital, and services. The idea driving the negotiations was

that governments should obligate themselves to not only providing MFN and

national treatment to the goods and nationals of other Member States, but to

constructing a domestic economy without access barriers (e.g., through the

obligations on restrictive business practices to investment protection)”

26)

.

2. The Academic Debate

The Havana Charter provisions on restrictive business practices were

preceded by a passionate academic debate. Two main ideas were developed by the

scholarly literature during the Bretton Woods era: first, that cartel activity is

dangerous and, second, that action against combines is necessary for the

attainment of a lasting peace.

After an inter bellum period characterized both by the fact that cartelization

was perceived as a necessary part of the surviving philosophy during the

belligerence and by the fact that cartelization substituted government action in

many instances, the academic society seemed to arrive at the conclusion that

cartels represent a dangerous business practice. As Taylor puts it, “after the World

War II, a paradigm shift in international thought occurred in which the adverse

political consequences of industrial cartelization were clearly recognized, as were

the adverse welfare effects of excessive concentration of economic power”

27)

.

25)

Havana Charter, Chapter VIII, ‘Settlement of Differences’.

26)

Peter S. Watson, Joseph E. Flynn and Chad C. Conwell, Completing the World Tradeing

System:Proposals for a Millennium Round (1999) The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 349.

27)

Taylor (2006), 149.

9

It was recognized that cartels restrict international trade

28)

and mitigate the

effects of reducing the tariff walls

29)

. They reduce competition, diminish the

incentives to innovate, limit the possibilities for the buyers to protect themselves

against low quality and limit new industrial capacity

30)

. Furthermore, authors that

followed the development of international cartels in the interwar period argued that

a link might be established between, on the one side, the cartel activity and, on the

other side, the left-wing politics and the antidemocratic movements like Fascism,

Hispanidad and Kokutai. In addition, in the international trade game, cartel activity

subdues not only individuals and companies, but also industries and governments.

One author concluded that “history has proven the cartel justifiers grossly in

error. Actually the cartel system fostered an economic Balkanization of the world.

It set up artificial economic states, commodity by commodity, each with its own

government, laws, division and trade barriers, imposed and superimposed over

one another with increasing complexity”

31)

.

During this period, it was acknowledged for the first time at the international

level that action was needed to prevent and counteract the effects that cartels

might have on trade

32)

. Action by both international and national policy-makers

was considered to be necessary

33)

. Even more, it was emphasized that only the

combined national and international efforts could lead to a successful geometry

against combines

34)

and that every policy concerning cartels should be based on

well-established principles and should be accompanied by attuned economic and

legal reasoning.

Despite the impressive number of works written on cartels dating from that

period, the export cartel issue seemed to be of no interest for the academia. This

contradiction can be explained, in part, by the broad formulation of Article 46 of

the Havana Charter and, in part, by the lack of political will to pursue such

practices. On the one hand, the Charter provision on restrictive business practices

could have been easily interpreted to prohibit – in case there was such a need -

practices like export cartels. On the other hand, the post-WWII pax Americana

opened promising markets for the US exporters. And while the US was the only

28)

F. E. Koch, ‘Cartels as Instruments of Internat ional Economic Organization. Public and

Private Legal Aspects of International Cartels’ (1945) 8 The Mode rn Law Review 3, 131.

29)

Theodore J. Kreps, ‘Cartels, a P hase of Business Haute Politique’ (1945) 35 The American

Economic Review 2, 309.

30)

Corwin D. Edwards, ‘International Cartels as Obstacle s to International Trade’ (1944) 34

The American Economic Review 1, 331-333.

31)

Quoted by Robert Liefman, International Cartels, Combines, and Trusts (1927) London:

Routledge and Sons, 100.

32)

Corwin D. Edwards (1944), 337.

33)

Klaus E Knorr, ‘The Problem of International Cartels and I ntergovernmental Commod ity

Agreements’ (1946) 55 The Yale Law Journal 5, 1105.

34)

Heinrich Kronstein, Gertrude Leighton, ‘Cartel Control: A record of Failure’ (1946) 55

The Yale Law Journal 2, 297.

10

exporter capable of satisfying the post-WWII needs, it appeared unreasonable for

the US policy-makers to deprive the American exporters of an important tool to

penetrate markets. In this context it is important to recall that the Havana Charter

was sabotaged by the US for various reasons

35)

: “The US State Department

viewed the Havana Charter as a threat to stricter US competition laws, while the

US Congress viewed it as an unwarranted threat to US economic hegemony and

domestic political sovereignty in the post-war era”

36)

.

A researcher following the evolution of the export cartels literature after the

WWII will be surprised by a contradiction. On the one hand, the provisions of the

Havana Charter prove the maturity of values of over fifty nations that by 1950

have ratified it. For that time the linking of trade, employment and social policy

constituted “a revolution in state policy making”

37)

. Also, “the consensus

embodied in the Havana Charter was path breaking for the nations of the world

because it created the template for all other similar broad initiatives”

38)

. On the

other hand however, the failure of the ITO project stands for the “immaturity” of

the international community to enforce these values.

This contradiction characterizes in fact the approach to trade during the whole

post-WWII period. As Moon notes, “although a liberal trading order was the

paramount objective of Bretton Woods, mercantilist concerns never disappeared,

and as a result, the tensions and discontinuities embodied in these two visions

became imbedded in the system itself”

39)

. On the one hand, the GATT and the trade

liberalization rounds brought further and further the free trade ideal and gave a new

meaning to trade relations in general. On the other hand, the League of Nations

wounds

40)

, the national egoisms and incapacities combined with the newly founded

American hegemony and the endeavor to protect the American industry interests

41)

brought about a paralytic international trade system that was not ready to respond to

some very important issues. One such issue was that of export cartels which was

likely to lead to the exploitation of the world consumers and which enforced “a

theoretical dichotomy in the philosophy of business operations”

42)

.

35)

G. Diebold, The End of the ITO: Essays in International Financ e No. 16 (1952) Princeton:

Princeton University, para. 2.5.

36)

Taylor (2006), 153.

37)

Daniel Drache, ‘The Short but Si gnificant Life of the International Trade Organization:

Lessons for Our Time’ (2000) CSGR Working Paper No. 62/00, 2 8.

38)

Ibidem, 23.

39)

Bruce E. Moon, Dilemmas of International Trade (2000) Oxford: W estwood Press, 91.

40)

Alfred E. Eckes Jr., ‘U.S. Trade Histor y’ in William A. Lovett, Alfred E. Eckes Jr. and

Richard L. Brinkman (eds), U.S . Trade Policy: History, Theory and the WTO (1999) New York:

M. E. Sharpe, 75.

41)

Andreas Dür, ‘Foreign Discrimination, Protection for Exporters, and U.S. Trade

Liberalization’ (2007) International Studies Quaterly 51, 457-480.

42)

Sidney A. Diamond, ‘The Webb -Pomerene Act and Export Trade Associations’ (1944) 44

Columbia Law Review 6, 832.

11

III. THE TRADE AND COMPETITION MOMENTUM

The debate on export cartels had its peak hour after the creation of the WTO

within the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition

Policy (WGTCP) and raised not only issues regarding the effects of the anti-

competitive behaviour on trade, but also issues regarding the developing countries

and the role of the WTO as such.

The issue of export cartels was heavily debated within the WGTCP. The

positions expressed reflect in fact the divide between the export cartels-friendly

countries and the export cartels-unfriendly countries. The US is the primary

example of an export cartel-friendly country. From all the communications

submitted by the US to the WGTCP between 1996-2004 only one mentioned the

issue of export cartels and this occurred at a rather late stage of negotiations. On

that occasion, the US pointed out that the issue of export cartels requires “further

and more focused discussion among WTO Members”

43)

. The European

Community (EC), on the other hand, condemned the export cartels since its first

communication to the WGTCP

44)

and constantly touched upon this issue during

the following years. One unexpected export cartels-unfriendly country was Japan.

Japan enacted legislation that exempted export cartels from the application of anti-

trust rules and made heavy use of this exemption to promote its industries.

However, during the life of the WGTCP, Japan expressed constant calls for an

international prohibition of export cartels

45)

.

Because of the fact that the Member States of the WTO expressed their

positions on export cartels in the context of the wider interface between trade and

competition, interesting linkages and conclusion were made. Two main types of

concerns were raised by the Member States in relation to the subject-matter of this

paper. First, Governments addressed substantive legal questions in relation to

export cartels. Second, important procedural concerns were expressed.

1. The WGTCP Substantive Challenge

During the existence of the WGTCP the WTO member States addressed the

following questions. First, the role of the WTO in dealing with trade and competition

interface was considered

46)

. Then, the ideological difference between trade policy and

43)

Communication from the United States, Working Grou p on the Interaction between Trade

and Competition Policy, WTO, WT/WGTCP/W/203 (data), paragrap h 7-8.

44)

Communication from the European Community and its Member States, W T/WGTCP/W/1.

45)

In this se nse, see the following communications form Japan: WT/WGTCP/W/52,

WT/WGTCP/W/119, WT/WGTCP/W/134, WT/WGTCP/W/135, WT/WGTCP/W/156 and

WT/WGTCP/W/177.

46)

Repor t (2000) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition

Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/4, p aragraph 82-83; Report (2001) of the Working

12

competition policy was tackled. In this sense, it was mentioned that the export cartel

exemption “gave excessive weight to the interests of national consumers and

producers, to the neglect of the interests of consumers in other countries”

47)

.

Third, the impact of the export cartels was discussed. The question whether

export cartels affect or not international trade was a crucial one. If this business

practice had an adverse effect on trade, then the call for multilateral action was

justified. If, on contrary, this type of collusion did not restrict international trade,

then the rationale for a multilateral agreement was missing.

In the WGTCP the view was expressed that export cartels restrict competition

in foreign markets

48)

. Export cartels were also used “as a strategic trade policy to

extract rents from foreign countries”

49)

. Other countries held the view that export

cartels “had pro-competitive effects in that they added additional players to the

relevant markets and might bring innovation or lower prices. Moreover, they were

not secret and therefore did not bear the hallmarks of what was traditionally

considered to be a hardcore cartel”

50)

. Responding to this last point, the

clarification was offered that “in fact, most export cartels involved multinational

companies, not small and medium-sized enterprises of the sort that might need to

bind together for efficiency purposes”

51)

.

The issue of developing countries was raised constantly in the framework of

the export cartels debate. It was stressed that “the victims of export cartels” often

included developing countries which were importing machinery or consumer

products. Furthermore, it was suggested “that the extent of such cartels and their

deleterious effects on international trade and development might well be greater

than was widely known, since most countries did not insist on registration of such

cartels; they simply turned a blind eye to them”

52)

. In addition, the point was made

that “developing countries should be allowed to exempt national and international

export cartels, since most developing countries' exporters or importers were

mainly small scale and might need to bind together to counter the bargaining

power of larger buyers or sellers from industrialized countries”

53)

.

Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Po licy to the Ge neral Council,

WT/WGTCP/5, paragraph 101.

47)

WTO (1998), Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and

Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, para graph 26.

48)

Repor t (1999) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition

Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/3, paragraph 71.

49)

Repor t (2002) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition

Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/6, paragraph 27.

50)

Repor t (2003) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition

Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7, paragraph 51.

51)

Ibidem, paragraph 52.

52)

Report (1998), paragraph 89.

53)

Report (2002), paragraph 35.

13

2. The WGTCP Procedural Challenge

Besides the substantive legal questions a few procedural concerns were

addressed during the work of the WGTCP in relation to export cartels.

First, it was recognized that in order to tackle such anti-competitive practices

in an effective manner, “there was a need for both effective national competition

policies and enhanced international cooperation at the bilateral, regional and

multilateral levels”

54)

.

Second, it was pointed out that in dealing with export cartels and other anti-

competitive practices at the national level, measures to promote the progressive

development of institutional capacities, the existence of effective and transparent

enforcement powers and the appropriate protection of confidential information

were needed

55)

.

Third, it was emphasized that the positive comity was unlikely to be an

appropriate tool to deal with export cartels because the requested country might be

reluctant to enforce its competition law at the expense of its own domestic

industry and primarily for the benefit of the complaining country

56)

.

Fourth, the jurisdictional emasculation in dealing with export cartels was

highlighted. On the one hand, the home authorities cannot punish the export

cartels because they have no or little effect on the domestic market. On the other

hand, the countries on whose markets the export cartels are active cannot pursue

them because they lack the necessary anti-trust tools and information. This led to

the conclusion that international cooperation was the appropriate means to deal

with these arrangements “since there were jurisdictional limits to the solution of

the problem solely through the application of competition legislation in the

exporting country”

57)

.

Lastly, it was suggested that the international cooperation in the field of

export cartels should be based on the principle of “no less favourable treatment in

terms of competition rights for citizens or firms of foreign countries than that

accorded to firms or nationals of the host country”

58)

.

3. The Academic Dispute

In parallel with the political debate in the WTO, an academic debate took

place in the scholarly circles. The following features can be said to characterize

the academic debate on export cartels from the 1990s on.

54)

Report (2001), paragraph 62.

55)

Report (1999), paragraph 26.

56)

Ibidem, paragraph 42.

57)

Report (2003), paragraph 50.

58)

Report (1999), paragraph 27.

14

a. Economic analysis of export cartels

Starting with the 1990s, the analysis of export cartels was permeated with

economic thinking. The main question raised was whether export cartels are

efficiency-enhancing or monopoly-promoting. Using different economics tools,

researchers attempted to predict in which sectors export cartels were more likely

to form. As a result, an anatomy of the Webb-Pomerene cartel was developed.

First, it was concluded that Webb-Pomerene cartels were more likely to ship

non-durable, capital-intensive, standardized products, to form in industries with

low seller concentration, and to form in growing export markets where the United

States had large market share

59)

.

Second, when describing the functions pursued by the Webb cartels, Dick

states that 45% of the Webb associations had as their primary function the setting

of common prices and/or the allocation of markets. The remaining 55% of Webb

cartels were used as an instrument to capture economies of scale

60)

.

Third, it was noted that export cartels were relatively short-lived, did not

reorganize after dissolution and did not become more stable due to the age or

experience

61)

.

b. Maybe export cartels are not so bad in the end?

One of the implications of the above-outlined economic analysis was the

conclusion that export associations do not always restrict trade and competition in

the foreign and in the domestic markets.

As regards the foreign markets, empirical research by Andrew Dick led to the

conclusion that the primary goal of the Webb-Pomerene associations was to assist

exports and that only a small part of the existing Webb-Pomerene associations can

in fact exercise overseas market power. In addition, Dick’s study on sixteen

commodities showed that foreign consumers benefited from the existence of

export cartels in six instances and were adversely affected in only three instances.

Also, the WPA benefited the US producers in nine industries by lowering costs or

enabling successful exercise of foreign market power

62)

.

In the same vein, Waller expressed the view that “the history of the Webb-

Pomerene Act suggests that few export associations will have sufficient global

market power to exploit foreign markets”

63)

.

59)

Andrew R. Dick, ‘Identifying Contracts, Co mbinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of

Trade’(1996) 17 Managerial And Decision Economics 2, 213.

60)

Ibidem.

61)

Andr ew R. Dick, ‘When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?’ (1996) 39 Journal Of Law And

Economics 1, 255-257.

62)

Andrew R. Dick, ‘Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or Monopoly-Promoting?

Evidence from the Webb-Pomerene Experience’ (1992) 15 Research In Law And Economics, 89-127.

63)

Spencer Weber Waller, ‘The Failure of the Export Trading Company Program’ (1992) 17

North Carolina Journal Of International Law And Commercial Regulatio n, 251-252.

15

A different approach to this issue was taken by Evenett, Levenstein and

Suslow. In their study these authors suggest that the global competition race might

sometimes dictate a choice between two evils. The collusive behaviour might

appear as the least dangerous option. Thus, a firm seeking to build the necessary

scale which would ensure a ticket for the global competition race can choose

between the creation of an export cartel and a merger or a joint venture. In this

case the first option seems to have the least anticompetitive effects

64)

.

As regards the domestic market, it was concluded that it will sense the

anticompetitive effect due to the formation of an export cartel only in the case of a

monopoly-promoting cartel. According to this line of argumentation the

anticompetitive spill-over will not reach the domestic market in case of an

efficiency-enhancing export cartel

65)

.

Strongly contrasting conclusions were reached by other scholars. A study

conducted by Larson concluded that the pursuit of monopoly profits abroad

guided the creation and existence of export cartels

66)

. In addition, export cartels

represent a beggar-your-neighbour policy because the “home country where such

cartel originates always gains, and the foreign country loses”

67)

. As such, the

restrictions on international trade created by export cartels not only reduce global

supply and welfare, but also hurt the interests of trading partners

68)

.

In relation to the work of the WGTCP Marsden noted that Members “raised

issues about almost every form of business arrangement, besides the policy

considered most directly relevant to their mandate: competition policy itself”

69)

.

Still, Marsden emphasized that the topic of export cartels should be addressed in

the framework of the WTO. An agreement on this issue would enhance the anti-

cartel co-operation and enforcement operations. Furthermore, export cartels

represent a truly development-related agenda concern and would find its place in

Doha easily

70)

.

Another important input was made by Victor. He argued that due to the fact

that since 1976 the Webb-Pomerene associations accounted for only 1.5 percent

of the US exports, the US export cartel statutes were not able to accomplish their

goals. Instead the Webb statute only facilitated some anticompetitive conduct,

64)

Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, ‘International Cartel

Enforcement: Lessons fro m the 1990s’ (2002) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.

2680, 1233, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265741 (last visited on 17 May 2009).

65)

Christia n Sc hultz, ‘Export Cartels and Domestic Markets’ (2002) 2 Journal Of Industry,

Competition And Trade 3, 223-246.

66)

David A. Larson, ‘An Eco nomic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act’ (197 0) 13 Journal

Of Law And Economics, 461-500.

67)

Sadao Nagaoka, ‘International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy’ (1998) NBER Working

Paper 6720, 3 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6720.pdf (last visited on 17 May 2009).

68)

Ibidem, 2.

69)

Philip Marsden, A Competition Policy for the WTO (2003) Cameron May, London, 59.

70)

Ibidem, 87.

16

both abroad and in the US market. For this, “the Webb Act has proven to be a

dismal failure”

71)

. Still, in formulating a recommendation, Victor argued that

protection should be withdrawn only from the monopoly-promoting export

cartels. Protection for efficiency-enhancing collusion should remain in place

72)

.

c. Export cartels and other fiends

One important feature of the scholarly literature that accompanied the 1990s

debate on export cartels was the endeavour to link the issue of export cartels to

other subject-matters.

In the context of the more classical linkage between competition law and

intellectual property law a novel conclusion was drawn as to the relation between

intellectual property law and export cartels. In this sense, Cottier and Meitinger

argue that “the lawful existence of export cartels in most jurisdictions is likely to

reinforce the doctrine of national exhaustion and thus of market segregation

abroad”

73)

. For this reason, Cottier and Meitinger recommend to adopt

international binding disciplines on export cartels in the framework of the WTO

which “may affect territorial use and allocation of IPRs and work in support of

enhanced market access opportunities”

74)

.

An interesting linkage was drawn between export cartels and antidumping

measures. It was stressed that from a welfare point of view only an international

action directed in the same time at the reform of the antidumping measures and

the abolition of export cartels can be conducive of welfare gains

75)

.

Lastly, in the context of the Japanese example, the point was made that export

cartels were an important mean to implement the Voluntary Export Restraints

(hereafter VERs) and the Multi-Fiber-Agreements. Consequently, the prohibition

and phasing-out of VERs at the WTO level led to the numerical reduction of the

export cartels in Japan

76)

.

d. Export cartels and the revisionary thinking

The debate on export cartels gave rise to a wave of revisionary thinking. Thus,

it was acknowledged that, prior to any further discussion on export cartels, a new

benchmark should be set for the evaluation of the impact that anticompetitive

practices might have on welfare. The old national welfare criterion – which

71)

Paul A. Victor, ‘Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed’ (1992) 60 Antitrust

Law Journal, 573.

72)

Victor (1992), 578.

73)

Thomas Cottier and Ingo Meitinger, ‘T he TRIPs Agreement without a Competition

Agreement?’ (1998) Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 65-99, 13, available at

http://www.iew.unibe.ch/unibe/rechtswissenschaft/dwr/iew/content/e3870/e3985/e4122/e4510/ipr

_suppl-lektion_5_ger.pdf (last visited on 17 May 2009).

74)

Ibidem, 14.

75)

Nagaoka (1998), 4.

76)

Ibidem, 10.

17

prohibits cartels in the domestic market, but immunizes them for the exercise of

foreign market power – was suitable for the old “international world”. The new

“globalized world” requires a new global welfare criterion which would prohibit

an anticompetitive practice even if its effects occur only in a foreign market.

An immediate consequence of this ethical re-evaluation of the welfare

criterion should be the establishment of the national treatment in the application of

competition policy. This would mean that domestic and foreign firms as well as

domestic and foreign consumers will be treated in the same way, without

discriminating between them. As an implicit consequence of putting on the same

footing the domestic and the foreign markets, export cartels should be

prohibited

77)

.

Before moving to the next point, one should observe that the constant players

of the trade and competition debate held within the WGTCP were the US, the EU

and Japan. Other Members had occasional inputs, without attempting to be strong

policy-shapers. Per total, 21,08 % of the WTO Members expressed an opinion on

export cartels during the work of the WGTCP. The following table illustrates

which policy-makers – except of the constant players mentioned above –

presented a policy statement concerning the export cartels. As the table clearly

shows, the occasional players are not many and they mainly represent the

developed world. This could stand whether for the lack of interest of the

developing world in this issue, or for a lack of know-how. Either way, the absence

of a multi-player debate was detrimental to the fate of the trade and competition

debate and led to the elimination of the issue from the WTO agenda.

The work and activity of the WGTCP highlighted one of the contradictions of

the recent trade relations. On the one hand, the issue of export cartels was

discussed for the first time at the multilateral level in an environment were each

Member had a voice and a chance to express a view. On the other hand, the same

WGTCP experience showed that the developing countries need not only a voice

and a forum to express this voice. The developing world needs to be empowered

with know-how. Otherwise their voice risks to play no role at all or even to rebel

against the developed world.

The discussions held within the WGTCP on trade and competition policy

reflect the developments in the Member States legislations. Also, they prove the

shift towards and the preference for market economy. On the other hand, these

discussions highlight the fact that some countries – despite the fact that they have

adopted a competition law – are not ready to play the trade and competition game.

Even if the trade and competition debate was finally expelled from the WTO

ambit, the author of the present paper takes the view that the work of the WGTCP

was highly successful and had a great impact on the competition policies around

the world. First of all, the activity of the WGTCP gave an occasion to the World

77)

Nagaoka (1998), 16.

18

Bank, the UNCTAD and the OECD to submit communications to the WTO.

While doing so, none of the above mentioned IGOs challenged the competence of

the WTO to deal with these issues, thus implicitly accepting that the WTO is the

right forum to address the trade and competition debate.

Also, the trade and competition debate provoked a wave of competition

thinking that reverberated in many of the regional trade organizations and in the

regional trade agreements

78)

. India, for example, considered incorporating

competition clauses in its bilateral trade agreements to prevent global cartels from

entering the country and to punish them for wrongdoing

79)

.

IV. THE POST TRADE AND COMPETITION DEBATE

After the failure of the trade and competition debate within the WTO, three

approaches were adopted in relation to the issue of export cartels: (1) the “no

business no cry” approach, (2) the “business as usual” approach and (3) the

“business reinvented” approach.

1. The “no business no cry” approach

The issue of export cartels was ignored by the WTO after the July package

decision. The reticence of the developing counties and the contradictory positions

of the US and the EU on this subject, led the policy-makers to the conclusion that

it was preferable to close the eyes at the problems raised by export cartels.

The same attitude was adopted by the newly-created International

Competition Network (ICN). The ICN has as mission to identify “subjects of

potential interests to Members” and to “consider proposals for projects including

those aimed at leading to non-binding general guidelines or ‘best practices’

recommendations”

80)

. Also, the ICN Cartel Working Group (CWG) is mandated

“to address the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement, both domestically and

internationally, across the entire range of ICN members and amongst agencies

with differing levels of experience”

81)

. However, the issue of export cartels was

never considered as a subject of potential interest to Members and was never put

on the agenda of the CWG. One plausible explanation of this could be the fact that

the ICN focuses mainly on hard-core cartels. Export cartels, on the other hand, are

78)

UNCTAD, Ways in Which Possible International Agreements on Competition Might Apply

to Developing Countries, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/46/Rev.3, 7 May 2007 .

79)

“Competition Clause May Find a Place in FTAs”, Financial Express, July 5, 2 007.

80)

International Competition Network Op erational Framework, available at

http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/about-icn/op erational-framework

(last visited on 17 May 2009).

81)

International Competition Network Working Grou p on Cartels Mandate, available at

http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/cartelworkplan2004.pdf (last

visited on 17 May 2009).

19

said to have some pro-competitive effects that outweigh the anti-competitive

damage. Still, the wording of the ICN documents leaves the strong impression that

export cartels represent a “no-issue” in the sense that this question was ignored on

purpose. In the report prepared for the ICN 4

th

Annual Conference the CWG

mentioned that “while the basic understanding of what constitutes a cartel and the

harmful effects of cartels is remarkably consistent across jurisdictions, there are

several complicating issues that give rise to different approaches in defining and

enforcing a cartel prohibition”

82)

. One such complicating issue is the existence of

anti-trust exemptions. Still, this report makes no reference to export cartels neither

as type of collusion with harmful effects, nor as practice exempted from the

application of competition rules. This approach sits very oddly with the fact that

the same competition authorities that argued – within the framework of the WTO

– in favour of a multilateral agreement prohibiting export cartels choose to

disregard this problem within the framework of the ICN.

2. The “business as usual” approach

Other international bodies whose work touches upon the trade and

competition debate did not make any significant inputs into the export cartels

discussion after 2004. For example OECD, in its latest country reviews, showed

that the situation of the export trade exemptions in the US did not change

83)

.

Contrary to the US, Japan undertook a process of revision of its anti-trust

exemptions and, as a result, there were no export cartel exemptions granted in

Japan at the time of the review

84)

.

At the national level, no new initiatives were taken for the abolition of the

export cartel legislation. The FTC and the DoJ in the US and the European

Commission in the EU deal both with competition issues and with trade issues.

Since 2004, none of these bodies undertook any research in relation to export

cartels. Neither have they referred to this issue in any official document.

In the US, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) was created in

2002 to examine the need “to modernize the antitrust laws”

85)

. One of the aims of

the AMC was to analyze in how far the impunities granted by the export

association legislation to exporters are justified in the 21

st

century

86)

. The most

important findings of the AMC in this sense are the following:

82)

“Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes (vol. 1) – Defining Hard-Core Cartel

Conduct” (2005), Report prepared by t he ICN Working Group on Cartels, available at

http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_4th_bonn_2005/Effecti

ve_Anti-Cartel_Regimes_Building_Blocks.pdf (last visited on 17 May 2009 ).

83)

OECD, United States – Report on Competition Law and Institutions (2004),

DAF/COMP(2005)13, 14.

84)

OECD, Regulatory Reform – Monitoring Review of Japan, DAFFE/COMP(2004)11/REV1, 20.

85)

Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-273 § 11053 (1).

86)

AMC Staff, Impunities and Exemptions Discussion Memorandum (11 July 2006), available at:

http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/IE-Statutory%20DiscMemo060711fin.pdf (last visited on 17 May

20

 The AMC acknowledged ab initio that any exemption to antitrust laws

benefits only some small and concentrated interest groups, while the costs of the

same exemption are bared by a large number of consumers. Since consumers are

likely to show no opposition to the enactment of exceptions to antitrust laws, the

Congress is likely to hear no complaints from those who bear in fact the cost of

the exemption

87)

.

 The AMC recognized that there is no reason that could justify why the

small and medium-sized companies “should be held to a lesser standard of

antitrust compliance than any other companies doing business”

88)

.

 The AMC noted that export association legislation raises a ‘particularly

acute concern’ insofar as it may be seen as granting immunity for cartel activity

abroad. For this, “it is inconsistent for US antitrust enforcers to emphasize to

foreign antitrust enforcers the importance of cartel enforcement at the same time

that US law immunizes what some consider to constitute overseas cartel behavior

by American firms”

89)

.

However, in the final recommendations presented to the US Congress and to

the President of the US the AMC made no specific proposal for the repeal of the

export cartel legislation. The AMC only stated in very broad terms that “statutory

immunities from the antitrust laws should be disfavored. They should be granted

rarely, and only where, and for so long as, a clear case has been made that the

conduct in question would subject the actors to antitrust liability and is necessary

to satisfy a specific societal goal that trumps the benefit of a free market to

consumers and the US economy in general”

90)

.

The AMC concluded that the US antitrust laws are “sound” and “sufficiently

flexible to allow for their continued ‘modernization’ as the world continues to

change and our understanding of how markets operate continues to evolve

through decisions by the courts and enforcement agencies”

91)

.

Another authority that adopted the “business as usual” approach was the

Supreme Court of the United States while delivering its decision in the Empagran

case

92)

. Although this case did not raise questions about export cartels, the

approach taken by the Supreme Court in Empagran is relevant to the subject

matter of this paper in so far as the Court clarified the relationship between the

2009); AMC Immunities and Exemptions Study Group, Immunities and Exemptions Working Plan (6

May 2005), available at: http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/ImmunitiesExemptionsStudyPlan.pdf (last

visited on 17 May 2009).

87)

AMC, AMC Report and Recommendations (2007) , p. 335, available at:

http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/introduction.pdf (last visited o n 17 May 2009).

88)

Ibidem, p. 352.

89)

AMC Report and Recommendations (2007), 353.

90)

Ibidem, p. 20.

91)

Ibidem, p. 2.

92)

F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).

21

existence of a foreign price-fixing activity that has requisite domestic effect and

that has independent foreign effects giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim.

The pre- Empagran case-law attempted an expansive interpretation of

FTAIA, allowing foreign plaintiffs to challenge foreign anticompetitive behavior

under the US antitrust laws. Thus, in Kruman v.Christie's International PLC

93)

, a

Second Circuit decision that involved the two largest auction houses in the world,

the court found that the FTAIA provides a standard for foreign plaintiffs to seek

relief in US courts

94)

. Unlike the majority view on this subject

95)

, the Second

Circuit court established that once the first prong of the FTAIA is met and the

requisite effect on the US commerce is established, the second prong of the

FTAIA – namely, “gives rise to a claim” – did not impose an important barrier to

the establishment of jurisdiction. The interpretation given to FTAIA in the

Kruman decision implies along the lines that if a foreign plaintiff proves that an

US export cartel affects US commerce, the US courts have jurisdiction to judge

the foreign effects in the US.

Taking into account the huge policy implications that the Kruman extensive

interpretation of the FTAIA might have had, the US Supreme Court sought to

clarify this issue in its Empagran case, by holding that:

The FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters (and to firms doing

business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into

business arrangements (say, joint-selling arrangements), however anticompetitive,

as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets (underlined by

the author). . . . It does so by removing from the Sherman Act’s reach (1) export

activities and (2) other commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those

activities adversely affect domestic commerce, imports to the United States, or

exporting activities of one engaged in such activities within the United States

96)

.

3. The “business reinvented” approach

If governments seemed to have embraced a “medieval” approach to export

cartels, the academic debate reached a state-of-the-art level concerning the same

topic. New elements were introduced in the debate and new perspectives were

proposed. And one might say, without running the risk of exaggerating, that it is

only due to academia that export cartels are still raised today as an important issue.

While looking for a solution to the export cartel problem, some authors

searched again in the trade and competition arsenal. Such an effort was

accompanied by a philosophical influx and justified by the belief that only by

demystifying the trade and competition debate, a solution could be found to the

more specific issue of export cartels.

93)

284 F. 3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).

94)

Kruman, 284 F. 3d at 401, 403.

95)

See in this sense Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5

th

Cir. 2001).

96)

542 U.S. 155, 161 (2004) (emphasis in original).

22

In this sense, Gerber emphasized that the future of the WTO is intricately

interwoven with competition law issues. He recognized that “the changes that

would be necessary to introduce and successfully implement competition law in

the WTO are to a large extent the same as those that the institution will need to

make if it is to enrich its role as an institution”

97)

.

Some political science elements were brought into the export cartels debate

and shifted the discussion into new directions. While emphasizing the exodus of

the economics thinking from the trade and competition debate, Kröll illustrated

that “competition policy has been used as a bargaining chip for mutual

concessions in other policy areas like agriculture and services”

98)

.

Interesting results were obtained by a few researchers who applied the

prisoner’s dilemma theory to the export cartels issue. Thus, Hoekman and Saggi

showed that companies originating in a high income country have little incentive to

cartelize in a low income country with a concentrated market structure and a high

tariff. On the other hand, when the low income country has a highly competitive

market, cartelization is highly profitable even if the low income country has a high

tariff. The authors concluded for these reasons that cartelization, combined with a

tariff represent a prisoner’s dilemma in a competitive market structure

99)

.

Sweeney, on the other hand, expressed the view that the incentives to discipline

export cartels present a prisoner’s dilemma in the sense that a country currently

prohibiting export cartels can always make itself better off by allowing them and a

country that currently permits export cartels can make itself worse off by

prohibiting them. Sweeney thus concludes that “in the absence of an agreement, the

world’s trading nations are in equilibrium when they permit export cartels”

100)

.

A similar conclusion was reached by Durand, Galarza, and Mehta who

examined the welfare effects of banning or allowing export cartels. The authors

scrutinized the following situations:

(a) in the situation when both the home and the foreign countries exempt

export cartels from antitrust prosecution, each country gains from its export

industry, but loses from the import sector;

(b) in the situation when the home country and the foreign country ban export

cartels, both countries’ welfare is maximized

101)

. However, this situation is unreal

97)

David J. Gerber, ‘Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship’ (2007) 10

Journal Of International And Economic Law 3, 707.

98)

Daniella Kröll (2007), 170.

99)

Bernard Hoekman and K amal Saggi, ‘Tariff Bindings and Bilateral Cooperation on Export

Cartels’ (2007) 83 Journal Of Development Economics 1, 144-145 .

100)

Brendan Sweeney, ‘Export Cartels: Is There a Need for Global Rules’ ( 2007) 10 Journal

Of International And Economic Law 1, 103- 104.

101)

Benoît Durand, Andrés Font Galarza and Kirtikumar Mehta, ‘The Interface Between

Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalization. Looking into the Future: Applying a

New Virtual Anti-Trust Standard’ (2004) 27 World Competition 1, 7 .

23

– noticed the authors – due to the fact that the home country and the foreign

country have a strong incentive to exempt export cartels.

Thus, when both the home and the foreign country ban export cartels, each

country reaches a welfare level of 15. However, if the home country chooses to

allow export cartels while the foreign country still bans this practice, the welfare

of the home country rises from 15 to 20 while the foreign country welfare falls

from 15 to 6. For this, the authors conclude that “if countries could co-ordinate

their antitrust policy to prosecute export cartels they would all reach a higher

welfare level”

102)

.

Other important inputs concerning the alleged beneficial or detrimental effects

of the export cartel legislation were made by Bhattacharjea who criticized the lack

of theoretical or empirical foundations of this debate and noticed that, in contrast

to the works published in the field of international cartels, no serious “arguments

seem to have been entered at any stage of the (export cartels) debate”

103)

.

In a 2006 study on the effects of the ETCs on exports, Levenstein and Suslow

concluded that nothing in their analysis “lends support to the notion that ETCs

increase exports above what they would be absent an antitrust exemption”

104)

.

This confirms the results of earlier studies on the ETC and WPA that economic

impact of these exemptions was small both in assisting US industries and in

promoting the exercise of market power by US firms.

Becker highlighted that, even in the advocates’ team, few would overtly agree

that an export cartel is something more than an attempt to enhance the exporting

state’s welfare at the expense of the target state or of the global welfare

105)

. Becker

also noted that “export cartel exemptions lead into a downwards spiral of

anticompetitive measures and counter-measures taken by governments and market

participants”

106)

.

4. The solutions

A remarkable feature of the post trade and competition debate on export

cartels is the endeavor to “produce” a solution to this debate.

More and more researchers seem to agree that a global consumer welfare

criterion should be at the basis of any effort to solve the export cartel issue.

Whatever path the policy-makers will choose to fall back on, the ideal that global

markets require global answers should prevail.

102)

Ibidem, at 8.

103)

Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘Export Cartels – A Developin g Country Perspective’ (2004) 38

Journal Of World Trade 2, 336.

104)

Margaret C. Levenstein and Va lerie Y. Suslow, ‘The Economic Impact of the U.S. Expor t

trading Company Act’ (2006) Ross School of Business Working Pap er No. 1036, 25.

105)

Florian Becker, ‘The Case of Export Cartel Exemptions: Between Competition and

Protectionism’ (2007) 3 Journal Of Competition Law And Economics 1, 115 .

106)

Ibidem, at 118.

24

Another matter of principle that should receive attention at an early stage of

the decision-making process is the developing states exemption. Some authors

agree that an exemption for developing states is justified and should cover only

cases of export from developing into developed states

107)

.

Lastly, it is important to consider what Levenstein and Suslow call the

“unintended consequence” of a global ban on export cartels. According to these

authors, practice shows that the elimination of cooperation as a legal possibility

can lead to a higher merger activity or to the lessening of competition in the

domestic market

108)

. This finding is in line with the ideas of the cartel literature

that confirmed that prohibiting cartels speeds concentration

109)

.

Turning to the feasible solutions now, the survey of the academic literature on

this subject leads to the identification of two paths of action for dealing with

export cartels: unilateral or non-cooperative action and cooperative action. The

following chart illustrates this classification.

Non-Cooperative/Unilateral Action on Export Cartels

A State that fights the incoming effects of an export cartel within its

jurisdiction can act unilaterally – that is, take action based on its sole will. A State

might take unilateral action based on hard-law measures or unilateral action based

on soft-law measures.

(a) Some trade and competition scholars argue that, due to the difficulties that

underpin all the proposed solutions to the export cartel issue, it might be

reasonable to focus academic and political attention on competition advocacy and

promotion of transparency in decision-making as a solution to this issue

110)

. This

accounts for unilateral action based on soft-law measures.

(b) There are however other authors who promote unilateral action based on

hard law measures, in the sense that a compulsory act is required from the

decision-makers. One unilateral response that could be given by the importing

state in case of a foreign export cartel acting within its jurisdiction is to allow its

own exporters to collude. Reciprocity however could be the start line of lose-lose

race in the global market. As highlighted before, when two countries ban export

cartels, their welfare level is 15; when two countries allow export cartels their

welfare level falls to 10. Furthermore, Hoekman and Holmes explained in an

107)

Sweeney (2007), 111-113.

108)

Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow, ‘The Changing International Stat us of Export

Cartel Exemptions’ (2006) 20 American University International Law Revie w, 813-814.

109)

Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and Ame rica 1880-1990

(1992) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Geor ge Symeonidis, The Effects of Competition :

Cartel Policy and the Evolution of Strategy and Structure in British I ndustry (2002) The MIT

Press: Cambridge.

110)

Sweeney (2007), 111.

25

earlier paper that, even under conditions of reciprocity, some states will continue

to ripe more benefits from their export cartels than other states

111)

.

The importing state may pursue another unilateral path and apply its own

competition law extraterritorially. Extraterritoriality, however, is escorted by a set

of intricacies that transform this option into a very complicated procedural matter.

Gaining access to information about the foreign exporters, fighting exporters’

immunity under the act of state doctrine or based on foreign sovereign compulsion

or international comity

112)

and enforcing a judgment against firms that do not hold

any assets in the importing state – these are only a few of the complicating issues

that render extraterritoriality a very difficult option

113)

.

Lastly, a state could unilaterally and – most probable – in breach with the

WTO agreements suspend some of the GATT/WTO rights (market access,

protection for intellectual property goods). This option is the one that would pose

the highest threat to the whole WTO system.

Cooperative Action on Export Cartels

The cooperative action on export cartels is the action based on the will of two

or more states. Depending on the number of the wills involved, the cooperative

action can be bilateral, regional, plurilateral or multilateral

114)

.

The Bilateral Action

Ryan argues that “bilateral action would require the signing of bilateral co-

operation agreements between jurisdictions which would oblige one party to

respond positively to a request for investigatory support from the other party, even

in cases where the practice under investigation is not a violation of the

competition law of the requested party”

115)

. Ryan furthermore concludes that

regional groupings of competition jurisdiction and enforcement agencies represent

the least problematic of the various approaches to export cartels

116)

.

Sweeney, on the other hand, concluded that the gain form bilateral agreements

would be minimal due to the fact that they focus on hardcore cartels and lack

dispute settlement mechanisms

117)

.

111)

Bernard Hoekman and Peter Holmes, ‘Competition Po licy, Developing Countries and the

WTO’ (1999) World Bank Working Paper No. 2211, 19.

112)

Ulrich I mmenga, ‘Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints between Trade and

Competition Policy’ (1995) 4 Pacific Rim Law And Policy Journal 93, 125-126.

113)

Sweeney (2007), 102-103.

114)

Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, P etros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade

Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (2006), Oxford: Oxford University P ress, 886.

115)

Stephen Ryan, ‘The Treatment of Export Cartels in EU and US Law’( forthcoming), 10.

116)

Ibidem, 11.

117)

Sweeney (2007), 104.

26

The Multilateral Action

Two main ingredients are conceivable as parts of a multilateral action against

export cartels: (a) multilateral agreement on export cartels and (b) competition

authority with investigatory powers. The following combinations are possible:

only agreement, agreement and supranational oversight or only supranational

oversight.

It is true that mandatory dispute resolution is impossible if countries cannot

agree on the rule that will govern the dispute. However, “because a

comprehensive code is not feasible today, it does not follow that efforts looking

toward future convergence are futile”

118)

.

Academia identified various types of potential export cartel agreements.

Guzman proposed to apply national treatment principles to export cartels

119)

. This

would lead to an agreement “to treat incoming and outgoing anticompetitive

conduct alike”

120)

.

Sweeney noted that, since “the most appropriate judge of the anti-competitive

nature of an export cartel is in fact the importing state”

121)

, a feasible solution

would be to conclude an agreement giving jurisdiction to the importing state. The

opposite solution can be a valid bargain as well, namely, an agreement in which

exporting state considers foreign harm

122)

.

Bhattacharjea suggested a multilateral agreement along the lines of a

“reverse” anti-dumping agreement. Where the export prices would exceed some

“normal value” – that is, the reverse of normal dumping – the importing state

would be entitled to impose a sanction on the colluding foreign firms

123)

. The

same author pleads for an agreement that allows the suspension of TRIPs and

other GATT/WTO rights as a penalty for anti-competitive behavior by foreign

exporters

124)

. Bhattacharjea’s proposals provoked a storm of reactions in the

academic world. While Sweeney agrees that an import duty is an approach that

makes a lot of theoretical sense, he argues that in practice such a duty will not

compensate for consumer losses and that “only in very limited circumstances will

a tariff applied to the cartel members induce the cartel members to disband the

cartel”

125)

. On the other side of the opinion spectrum, Magnus argued that “global

antitrust discussions can much more usefully focus on what importing countries

118)

Robert Pitofsky, ‘Competition P olicy in a Global Economy – Today and Tomorrow’

(1998), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/global.shtm (last visited o n 17 May 2009).

119)

Andre w Guz man, ‘The Case for In ternational Antitrust’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal Of

International Law 355, 372.

120)

Becker (2007), 126.

121)

Sweeney (2007), 106.

122)

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroid is, ‘Economic Development, Competition Po licy

and the World Trade Organization’ (2003) 37 (1) Journal Of World Trad e 1, 20.

123)

Bhattacharjea (2004), 353.

124)

Bhattacharjea (2004), 356.

125)

Sweeney (2007), 102-103.

27

do (under their antitrust laws) to limit imports, rather than on what exporting

countries do not do (under their antitrust laws) to limit joint exports”

126)

.

The nature and the political issues underlying the export cartels suggest that

supranational oversight by an international tribunal is desirable. The WTO is

recognized by many scholars as the most suitable candidate for this position due

to its half a century expertise in trade

127)

. However, many unsolved problems pave

the way to recognizing the WTO as a supranational competition authority.

Summing up the results of the post trade and competition momentum, one

should notice that there are fewer states nowadays that grant explicit exemption

for export cartels. However, Levenstein and Suslow concluded that “the legal

status of export cartels is now more, not less, ambiguous”

128)

due to the fact that

enforcement became conditional on domestic harm and due to the lack of

conclusive information. For this, Levenstein, Suslow and other scholars

recognized that despite the already published studies and papers on export cartels,

more antitrust and economics literature is needed on this subject. Furthermore,

more comparative studies are needed about cartels’ relationship to politics,

political culture and law

129)

.

A wave of thinking in the trade and competition debate recognized that

confidence-building is as important as solution-finding. Like Durand, Galarza and

Mehta put it, any measure that would bring about the necessary paradigm shift in

the trade and competition debate “could arise only out of the conviction that this

will work in favour of everybody’s ultimate interest”

130)

.

The interdependence between global trade and global peace was brought into

light again.

Finally, a key question raised today concerns the solution that should be

adopted in relation to the export cartel issue. One should note first of all that none

of the solutions proposed until now by the academia is “trouble-free”. While some

suggestions collide with serious political weaknesses, others are powerless from a

legal reasoning point of view. I propose following a policy level analysis and

choosing the solution which the best from the point of view of its costs.

A thorough analysis of the proposed solutions shows that the non-

cooperative/unilateral action implies that on a first policy level export cartel

legislation should remain in place and only on a second policy level action should

be taken. Such a policy structure is quite dangerous not only because it creates

double costs (due to the double policy level in place), but also because the measures

126)

John R. Magnus, ‘Joint Export Trade Provisions in Antitrust Laws: A Supporter’s

Perspective’ (2005) 39 Journal Of World Trade 1, 184.

127)

Eleanor M. Fox, ‘International Antitrust and the Doha Dome’ (200 3) 43 Virginia Journal

Of International Law 911, 926-27.

128)

Levenstein, Suslow (2005), 812.

129)

Fear (2006), 26.

130)

Durand, Galarza and Mehta (2004), 4.

28

based on unilateral action can provoke unwanted reactions from other trading

partners and can lead to conflicts. This can be observed in relation to some

countries’ attempt to apply their antitrust law extraterritorially. Last but not least,

unilateral action on export cartels is very likely to sabotage the multilateral trading

system by suspending TRIPs, GATT or other WTO rights. For this reason, the great

majority of scholars writing on export cartels support a cooperative approach for

solving this problem. The author of this paper endorses the same approach.

The cooperative action, on the other hand, can take two forms:

(a) cooperative action with one policy level and (b) cooperative action with

two policy levels.

Cooperative action on export cartels in the form of a multilateral agreement

will require expenses only for the negotiation of the agreement. On the other

hand, cooperative action on export cartels in the form of multilateral agreement

plus supranational oversight will require costs not only for the negotiation of the

agreement, but also for the creation and functioning of the supranational

oversight. A preliminary conclusion then would be that cooperative action with

one policy level is cheaper and therefore preferable to cooperative action with two

policy levels.

However, I argue that one should consider other factors except the costs. First

of all, no agreement is “violation-free”; no matter who gave the promise to honor

a deal, there would be always an incentive for breaching the export cartel

agreement. Second, a breach of a multilateral agreement can easily lead to the

breakdown of the whole multilateral trading system. That is why the effort to

conceive a solution for export cartels in the form of an agreement should be

accompanied by a parallel effort to prevent and punish breaches. In case of not

considering this aspect, the price of having in place a multilateral agreement

without oversight can be higher than having the oversight in the first instance.

Lastly, when considering the supranational oversight as a compulsory element

of the solution for export cartels, it is commendable to balance the financial costs

with other benefits that might arise from having in place supranational oversight

for the export cartel agreement. I presume that the WTO is the most suitable

authority to be entrusted with the supervision of the export cartel agreement

131)

.

Therefore, the author of the present paper believes that the costs of having a WTO

body responsible for export cartel issues will be compensated by the following

benefits:

 The WTO supranational oversight of export cartel issues will bring a new

wisdom into the WTO. The recent Telmex case, many of the Anti-Dumping

131)

The author of this paper is of course aware of all the theoretical and practical difficulties

that accompany such a prop osition. However, the results of her research could not identify another

institution that could serve as an en forcement mechanis m better than the WTO. That is why she

presumes and recommends that once a multilateral agreement on export cartels will be concluded ,

the WTO should serve as the accompanying enforcement element of the agree ment.

29

Agreement issues and the TRIPs experience show there is need for competition

law thinking in the WTO. A specialized committee on export cartels can develop

into a competition law committee or restart the activity of the WGTCP. Thus,

from a specialized body the committee on export cartels can grow into a

multilateral antitrust agency or into a consultative body on antitrust issues. Either

way, such a body would definitely benefit both trade and competition and would

bring more legitimacy to some of the WTO actions.

 A WTO export cartel body would also contribute to the confidence

building between the WTO members. Trade and competition was excluded from

the Doha negotiations due to the low level of confidence that existed between

Members. Antitrust was perceived as a secret gun that the developed world tried

to use against the developing world. Once the WTO members could agree on any

of the trade and competition issues raised during the Doha negotiations – and here

the export cartels could be a prime problem to agree on – the level of confidence

in the WTO and in the trading partners will increase.

 Having a WTO export cartel body will also prevent breaching the

agreement. This in turn will enhance the aura of fairness which is essential for the

well-being of the multilateral trading system.

CONCLUSION

This paper pursued the development of the academic and political writings on

export cartels from the adoption of the Webb-Pomerene Act until today. Four

phases of the export cartel debate were identified and analyzed. The following

conclusions can be drawn to bring to a close this paper:

Despite almost one hundred years of debate, there is still little known about the

export cartels, about how they work and about their incoming or outgoing effects.

The export cartels debate has not changed a great deal in the last one hundred

years: the same dichotomist approach is applied and an export cartel is always

seen against the “good or bad” background.

The government ordered research on export cartels is almost absent. The

export cartel debate is ongoing only due to the academia. It is also due to scholars

that economic, political and philosophical thinking was introduced into the export

cartel debate.

Even if neither the export cartels debate, nor the WTO trade and competition

debate have delivered “enforceable” results so far, both debates prove to be

successful. First of all, these debates represented a necessary process of learning.

Second, the trade and competition debate within the WTO provoked a period of

renaissance for the competition culture around the world. This momentum

delivered competition law talks within the regional trade organizations and

competition law provisions being negotiated into more free trade agreements. The

same momentum created the required conditions for the adoption of competition

laws around the world.

30

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