Clientelism: electoral forms and functions in the Romanian case study.

• Author: Volintiru, Clara
• Position: Report

Clientelism--generally taken to mean contingent direct exchanges between patrons and clients, has the potential to be a major factor of power wielding in the political process of a democracy. This paper explores how the electoral process in a new democracy may become embedded with clientelistic practices. The Romanian case study offers the opportunity to explore the forms and electoral functions of such practices, considering the contextual incentives and limitations that political parties are facing when attempting to mobilize their electorate. The first three sections of this study engage with the theoretical framing of clientelism within the discipline of political science. This discussion is structured along the significance of the topic in terms of its practical implications, the evolution of the concept, and the classification of its different forms. It is highly necessary to pinpoint these conceptual references, as clientelism is one of the most loosely used labels both in the academia and in public discussions. The theoretical claims made in this paper spread a much larger web than what can be supported with this study's empirical scope. Nevertheless, they do not remain unsupported, as they draw on the wider research on clientelism conducted in different contexts across the world, thus mapping similarities and converging in a common theoretical base for topical research.

The fourth section proposes a working model for the different types of electoral mobilization. The question is not whether an electoral system is programmatic or clientelistic, as informal exchanges usually take place in parallel with the programmatic ones, but whether or not clientelism prevails. Therefore, the programmatic political action is here considered to belong to the Formal Electoral System (FES), and the clientelistic electoral mobilization attributed to the Paralel Electoral System (PES). Thus, within this framing of electoral practices, the hypothesized distinctions between short-term and long-term clientelism are explored.

1. Why is clientelism pervasive for the democratic process and public institutions?

   Patronage and preferential spending are indeed occurrences of our everyday lives. They are not always malign endeavors, in both practice and intent, and more so, they can often be perceived as honest, or justified actions. Merton (1968) considered clientelism to be "humanizing and personalizing all manner of assisstence to those in need", while Muller (2006) and Hopkin (2006a) observe its integrative function, in linking the citizens to their political representatives. That is why the significance of studying such practices is sometimes questioned. The relevance of studying clientelism, for a political scientist, is sourced in the distortion that iterative linkage mechanism might cause on the accountability relationship between elective representatives, and the citizens of a polity. Thus, as this research endeavor supports, the reverberating effects of such practices are profound, and alter to the core the accountability relationships in a democratic society.

   The literature finds common ground in what concerns the negative effects of clientelistic practices, as many assessment revolve around three dimensions: electoral, economic, institutional. Along the first dimension, clientelism distorts electoral competition, by generating "incumbency effects" (Wantchekon 2003), and thus diminishing significantly the contestation chances of the opposition. This means that even if a person is discontented, or disillusioned with the performance of her elected representative, she will most likely be inclined to vote and support him/her the second time around, because of the conditionality of the networks of resource distribution. The costs of changing the status quo become apparently, or in the short term, too steep in a clientelistic society, and thus, the accountability relationship looses its main strength--the ability to impose sanctions. On the long term, clientelism may also affect electoral competition by provoking a populist backlash (Muller 2006), which is equally dangerous considering that it is often only a change of actors, not of habits, as the case of Romania demonstrates it.

   Secondly, there are also economic implications of clientelism. It leads to economic inefficiency, by discouraging the government from pursuing growth (Medina and Stokes 2007). As Chubb (1981/1983) points out in the case of Italy, the economic crises may actually enhance the role of the party as the privileged channel of access to resources. As the multiplier effects of the economy diminish, more and more citizens become reliant on informal channels of resource distribution. This type of resource hoarding may include jobs in the public sector, public contracts for entrepreneurs, or simple distribution of goods--food, cloths etc.

   Finally, although clientelism and corruption are two separate phenomena, they are interlinked, as the first may incite the latter. The rationale through which the clientelistic relationship is maintained--"primacy to the distribution of individual, selective benefits to citizens, to the detriment of the provision of collective goods" (Hopkin 2006a), is itself a prescription for venal use of state resources. Kitschelt (2000) asserts that high scores of corruption are a good indicator of the prevalence of clientelism. But, clientelism ? s impact and effects on society are not always clear-cut. While electoral competition is straightforwardly affected by informal exchanges, in the case of corruption or economic deprivation, it is hard to say which is the cause of which. In this regard, Stokes (2009, 623) underlies, clientelism is intimately linked to poverty and inequality, of which it is probably both a cause and a consequence. For this reason, in-depth, exploratory case studies like this one may shed more light on the mechanisms that reinforce such practices.

2. Evolution of the Concept

   Through historical and cultural assessments, patron-client relations were seen in the 70s-80s literature, as being typical for pre-industrial societies--a primitive form of organization that would be destroyed by democratization or strengthening of states. In this conceptual frame, Scott (1972: 92) defines patron-client relationship as:

   [] a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patrona[] This definition portrays an asymmetrical relationship between the patron and the client. As explained by Lande (in Schmidt et al 1977:xiii) []dyadic relationships are composed of only two individuals, and thus are micro-level entities[]. Such personal ties are necessarily based on mutual, and general social trust (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Tilly (2004) refers to such basic units of social organization as "trust networks".

   The redefinition of clientelism in the past decade is encouraged by the fact that the prophecy of self-defeat turned out to be false. Clientelism persisted in developed countries as well as less developed one, disregarding the system of rule (authoritarianism, democracy). Piattoni (2001) explains this fallacy by observing how "democracy strengthens the clients' bargaining leverage vis-a-vis brokers and patrons". Therefore, clientelism was not crushed by democracy and programmatic platforms, but rather forced to evolve into a more "complex pyramidal exchange network of client-broker-patron exchange" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:8). Hopkin (2001) emphasizes the distinction between the "old" and the "new" clientelism. He argues that this mass party clientelism involves parties distributing state resources to groups, areas or individuals in exchange for their votes, and is less unequal, less personalized and more explicitly materialistic relationship than the old clientelism (2001:3). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2001:4) underlie other changes: "clientelism thus evolves into a more symmetrical (rather than asymmetrical), instrumental-rational (rather than normative) and broker-mediated (rather than face-to-face based) exchange relationship". In accordance to this new mechanism of clientelistic dominance, they also develop a new definition of clientelism as a transaction--"the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods and services" (2007:2).

   This new definition accounts for three major changes in perspective. Firstly, it captures the symbiotic relationship between the patron and the state, which is the first supplier of the goods and services that the patron/broker transacts. It thus portrays a full-scale social hierarchy. Secondly, this definition accounts for Piettoni's emancipation of the client. In theory, it is no longer an asymmetrical relationship of dominance, but rather a commercial transaction between equal parts each offering what the other desires. Still, in practice, the fact that the broker/patron has political or economic monopoly (Medina and Stokes 2007) (or at least is part of an economic or political oligopoly) demonstrates the persistence of an asymmetrical relationship. Apparently, it is also a shift from vertical relationships, to horizontal ones. The citizenship offers a bargaining leverage to the client, but it is not always respected or applied and therefore, the dependency of the client remains significantly higher than that of the patron in the absence of bottom-up, popular mobilization. Thirdly, this new definition accounts for the need of intermediation in modern clientelistic networks. Electoral clientelism requires vast mobilization structures that can no longer be served by Scott's dyadic relationship.

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