Challenges at EU's New Eastern frontier twenty years after USSR's fall.

• Author: Popescu, Liliana
• Position: POLSCI PAPERS

1. Russia and the European Union--parallel evolutions in the last two decades

   The fall of USSR has been accompanied and followed by a series of processes: from independence movements and declarations to breakaway attempts--some of them successful--inside the newly independent states. The end of 1991--twenty years ago--brought with it the disintegration of the large soviet empire. The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was a period of change, which brought liberalisation and eventually democratization in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries that were previously part of the soviet bloc--the satellites during the cold war--went through a reorientation process in their foreign policy. The need for security, both political and economic, drew them closer to their western neighbouring community, the European Community, in a period of neo-liberalism rise. The European Union--or the Common Market as it was best known during that time--started to be wooed by the newly liberated states which broke free from their soviet satellite status and acquired independence from the decayed soviet empire. The centripetal force of EU as well as the looming prospect of integration into a promising political entity named European Union after Maastricht made the former satellites to be active in their westwards orientation and seek concrete steps to get closer.

   Meanwhile, Russia, who inherited most of the assets of the former USSR--for good and for worse--attempted to reorganize its neighbours and keep them close to the centre. The Community of Independent States was formed in December 1991--the same period of time when the European Council was drafting the Maastricht Treaty, to be signed in February 1992. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was founded in 1992 at the initiative of Russia, but gathered much fewer former republics than CSI--certainly not Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. If we follow the evolution in parallel of the two main power centres in Eurasia we may notice that while the Copenhagen Council was defining criteria to be followed and achieved by countries aspiring to become EU members (1993), Russia's top advisors were coining the ,near abroad' concept. In the same year Yeltsin succeeded in having the Duma deputies vote a new Constitution that enhanced considerably the powers of the president, thus creating the premises for a rather de-balanced share of powers and for the reversal of democratisation. And he succeeded that after a bloody episode in Moscow in which hundreds of people were killed or injured. The time of liberalisation and attempted democratisation of the Russian Federation--spanning roughly between 1985--1993--was longer than the one in the beginning of the XXth century, when the first Duma was set up, but lasted less than a decade. Nevertheless, the freedom of Russians increased in comparison with soviet times. Meanwhile, the liberal democratic character of the Russian regime slid from a burgeoning democracy during Yeltsin's first years to a pseudo-democracy in the late Putin's years and Medvedev--to use Larry Diamond's concepts (1996).

   While EU strengthened itself in the mid 1990s with the richest wave of enlargement with three neutral countries: Sweden, Austria and Finland, Russia got heavily caught in the first Chechen war. Two years later, the economic crisis that started in South East Asia severely hit Russia and all the countries strongly linked economically with her, including the "near abroad" countries in the western part of CSI, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The end of the 1990s brought to power Vladimir Putin and the rise of United Russia, a second mandate for Kuchma in Ukraine and the rise of the Communist Party in the Republic of Moldova. In the same period, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and ratified, and preparations for enlargement--a 'big bang' enlargement to the east of the EU--were on their way. The Councils of Luxembourg (end of 1997) and the Council of Helsinki (end of 1999) paved the way to the accession of twelve new countries--most of them either former soviet republics or former soviet satellites. Year 2000 brought with it yet another event: the beginning of rethinking the bases of the European Union and the project of a convention meant to debate a Constitution for the EU. The large wave of enlargement actually occurred in 2004, and 2007 respectively. Most of these countries became NATO members first, and only afterwards EU members. The proximity of NATO and the seemingly closer and closer Alliance generated concerns in Moscow. Meanwhile, EU developed its second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, however, without progressing much beyond the intergovernmental level in the following years.

2. A Developing Relationship, Distinct Profiles: EU and Russia

   The legal basis of the relationship between the EU and Russia was set up in 1994 and entered into effect in 1997. The legal document signed by the EU and Russia took the shape of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and it was based on the promotion of international peace and security and on the support of democratic norms and freedoms. It involved a mutual partnership in key fields like economy, culture, education, science and technology and other areas. The PCA was accompanied by an array of institutionalized meetings scheduled at various levels.

   The Common Strategy of the EU on Russia (1999), like the PCA, set the goals of integrating Russia into a common economic space and of strengthening the stability and security through cooperation. One year before the first eastward EU enlargement, the EU and Russia agreed to enhance the existing PCA by creating four "common spaces" (St. Petersburg Summit, May 2003) covering 1) economic issues, 2) freedom, security and justice, 3) external security, 4) research and education. The subsequent consistence of the cooperation of the two sides was rather poor. However, the relationship grew at least formally if not substantially. There are many reasons why the substance of the relationship suffered: the rather closed business environment of Russia towards the business interests of Europeans and the development of a state controlled economy to a large extent, the enhanced rigours of the common European market, including the common policies regarding the admission of citizens outside the EU, which are generating frustrations for Russian citizens, among others. The list could continue. The eastward EU enlargement process, started in mid 1990s, continued with the de facto admission of East Central European (ECE) countries in 2004 (ten countries, including the Baltic states) and in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). For EU the two stages of enlargement represented a risk as well as an achievement. The previously acquired NATO membership by these countries was regarded with concern by Russia. However, it is debatable what upset more the Russian leadership: the enlargement of NATO or the enlargement of the EU. Samokhvalov believes that Moscow is more concerned with the EU enlargement (2007). Russian leaders know the value of economic ties between neighbours and how they are transformed in influence and political power in time.

   Russia gradually placed herself in a superior position, in the second part of the years 2000s, cultivating an 'asymmetric interdependence' with the EU, using various means but especially energy means (Leonard & Popescu 2007). In contrast, EU leaders are looking for peace and stability in a rather mutual and balanced interdependence. Nonethelsess, different member states display different positions towards Russia. In the Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, Leonard and Popescu identify the following categories: 'Trojan Horses' (Cyprus and Greece), 'Strategic Partners' (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), 'Friendly Pragmatists' (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia), 'Frosty Pragmatists' (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom), 'New Cold Warriors' (Lithuania and Poland). Meanwhile, some of these countries changed their positions. Thus, Poland might have migrated from the cold warrior category towards 'friendly pragmatist' one, whilst Romania probably migrated from the 'frosty pragmatists' category towards the 'new cold warrior' side. The main idea of the audit is that there are remarkable differences between EU member states with regard to Russia. One of the consequences is that Russia may play on these differences, may make use of the roman "divide et impera" principle, in order to achieve her purposes. This is what actually happened with the bilateral relation between Russia and Germany with respect to providing gas, for instance; also, with the countries involved in the South Stream project later on.

   In contrast to the beginning of the 1990s, during Yeltsin's first years as president of Russia, when Russia's foreign policy was dominated by liberals, looking westward and displaying eagerness in emulating European democratic values, the situation changed dramatically in the following decade. A liberal approach in foreign policy has been replaced by realist perspectives and even an aggressive geopolitical civilizationism (Secrieru 2008). Klitsounova (2009, p. 103) remarks that "in the course of the 2000s Western political influence within Russia was severely reduced, both in rhetoric and in practice". Moreover, the perceptions over major events happened in Russia's "near abroad", which gradually became EU's eastern neighbourhood in the same decade, became gradually very different. While in EU, the 2003-2005 wave of uprisings (the .colour revolutions' in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) were seen as revolutions and as democratic breakthrough, the Kremlin did not see them the same way. On the contrary, they were seen "as regime change sponsored by the West in order to advance...