'Backseat driving': European institutions and crisis management in Moldova.

• Author: Davies, Cara M.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is one of the largest economic powers in the world but has often been reluctant to engage in international affairs on a level commensurate with its potential might. Although attempts at forging a common European foreign policy reach back to the 1970s with the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC), member states have been reluctant to sacrifice what is seen as one of the most crucial aspects of sovereignty--the right to independent international conduct for the sake of greater European cohesion. In the case of Moldova, a small country on Europe's periphery, the European institutions have played largely separate roles in directing the EU's relationship with the country since its split from the Soviet Union twenty years ago. The conflict between the member states' desire to retain some national autonomy and the need to maintain a united European front in world affairs has led to a unique arrangement among the institutions of the EU, which utilize civilian and 'soft' power mechanisms to further foreign policy goals in Europe's near abroad.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the European Union, placing its competencies firmly in the hands of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers as a gesture to member states anxious to retain sovereignty in foreign affairs. However, as noted by a former External Affairs Commissioner, the supranational European Commission still maintains a degree of control over European foreign policy. While the member states in the Council may determine the political direction of foreign policy, the Commission is often pulling the levers in the back room to get the foreign policy machinery moving (Patten, 2006: p. 158). This 'backseat driver' metaphor is very useful in explaining the intertwined roles of both the Council and the Commission in European relations with Moldova, which have emerged despite the member states' general desire to maintain foreign policy as a strictly intergovernmental policy area. The recent post-Lisbon Treaty reforms, particularly the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), are creating stronger diplomatic links between Moldova and the European Union, and the Commission is now more able to use its expertise in practical areas such as development, trade and energy to implement the foreign policy goals of the Council.

I intend to argue that the crossover between competencies is a result of functional 'spillover', particularly in the context of the EU's relations with Moldova and the near abroad. To examine the Commission's role as the 'backseat driver' of European foreign policy, I will briefly chart the development of CFSP from EPC and the treaties' interpretations of the foreign policy competencies of both the Council and the Commission before contextualizing these developments in terms of EU-Moldovan relations. The policy frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in the disputed Transnistrian region provide clear examples of how the European Council and Commission perform complementary functions while promoting European foreign policy aims, while the aftermath of the election crisis of 2009 demonstrates the role that the new High Representative for CFSP has played in creating a more cohesive policy response to crises on Europe's borders. By tracking the relations between Moldova and the EU institutions over the past two decades, I will demonstrate the way in which the Commission and Council's roles in European foreign policy have grown from what was suggested in the treaties.

Data for this analysis were collected from the published statements of Commission officials and Council declarations between 2004 and 2011, including speeches, press releases and treaties between Moldova and the EU. The narrow date range reflects the relatively recent development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Moldova's efforts to move closer to Europe. By observing how the instruments used by either the Council or the Commission are discussed in a public forum, it is possible to see how the Commission's 'backseat driving' allows these institutions work together to achieve stability in Moldova.

A Theoretical Framework

The project of pooling sovereignty, particularly in the process of foreign policy coordination as seen with CFSP, proves baffling for realist theorists. As the EU is a sui generis entity, operating halfway between a traditional state actor and an international organization, academics have had to develop their own theoretical models to explain its behaviour (Wallace, 2007: p. 3). Realist and interdependence theories can help to explain some aspects of CFSP, but the most useful tool for explaining the Commission's 'backseat' role in foreign policy can be found in neofunctionalism.

Realist theories focus on the state as the primary actor in international affairs and view international relations as a state of constant competition, with hostilities simmering below the surface of any peaceful interaction. Therefore, although realists cite member states' concerns with retaining national sovereignty and their desire to avoid surrendering foreign affairs to a supranational authority to support their case, this theoretical model fails to explain foreign policy coordination in the EU (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: p. 90; Smith, 2004: p. 20). Often, member states' power politics are balanced against competing objectives or muted because of other factors, leading to compliance with CFSP decisions that may not produce any evident gains for a member state. Realists also face difficulty in explaining the magnitude of the EU's impact on the international system, despite its limited foreign policy mechanisms (Sjursen, 2003: p. 38). Likewise, it is impossible for realists to explain why state objections to CFSP have not led to a return to the EPC structure, but have instead led to a lengthy process of reform; although Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig argue that the EU treaties since Maastricht have merely restructured the existing constitutional system rather than providing serious reforms, the EU has progressively expanded its foreign policy competencies rather than returning all foreign policy-making to the member states (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: p. 83).

Interdependence theories suggest that as security concerns between one set of states diminish (in this case, the EU member states) and foreign policy issues become increasingly entangled with economic and security issues, those states will cooperate to manage the costs and benefits of their external relations (Smith, 2004: p. 21). Although this theory is helpful in explaining the necessary conditions for developing CFSP, it is inadequate for explaining the evolution of a European foreign policy. Within the EU, states often find it easy to agree on foreign policy goals (such as promoting democracy and human rights abroad) while remaining divided on the best ways to achieve those goals (Dahl, 2000: p. 8). In the institutional structure of CFSP, this can be demonstrated by the divisions between supranational and intergovernmental competencies--while all economic issues and some political issues have been comfortably allocated to the Commission's responsibility, security and defence remain firmly intergovernmental, and the Council retains its supervisory role in most political fields (Smith, 2004: p. 213). Despite agreeing to the acquis communautaire, member states prefer to retain freedom of action in developing policies in politically-sensitive areas--and although the Council's control of CFSP does create an intergovernmental policy process, how can we explain the Commission's crucial role as 'backseat driver'?

Neofunctionalism and the related concept of 'spillover' offers a better framework for understanding the growing role of the Commission in CFSP. This theory acknowledges that policy areas are increasingly interlinked and, as institutional cooperation in one area leads to spillover into other areas, a dynamic process of deepening is created in the European Union (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009: p. 52). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) identified the concept of sectoral (or functional) spillover, wherein integration in one sector (such as agriculture) leads to integration in another related sector (such as transportation); other authors have also identified the concept of political spillover, whereby an activity in one sector becomes increasingly politicised at the supranational level, and cultivated spillover, which focuses on the role actors such as the EU institutions play in facilitating integration (Diez and Wiener, 2009: p. 8; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: p. 94; Rhodes and Mazey, 1995: p. 31). While neofunctional spillover has frequently been used to explain the gradual evolution of the common market into a customs union and finally a monetary union, it can also be used to explain the expansion of the Commission into foreign policy despite member states' desire to keep this competency on an intergovernmental basis. Various authors have pointed out that EPC evolved from a desire to protect the economic policies of the EC, and it is precisely this desire to secure Europe's international economic interests that has gradually led to a stronger role for the Commission in European foreign policy (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009: p. 57). Although treaty reforms have consistently attempted to restrict the role of the Commission in CFSP, even placing foreign policy in a strictly intergovernmental pillar outside the supranational competencies of the Commission, the Commission's role in funding crisis management missions and negotiating international trade and accession agreements with neighbouring countries on behalf of the EU gives it a great deal of leverage in foreign policy (Gourlay, 2006b: p. 117). While the...