Romanian foreign policy in the context of transatlantic divergences.

• Author: Micu, Mircea
• Position: Essay

Abstract: There were at least four situations in which European and American stances over how international politics should be conducted clashed and in which Romania was pressured to take one side or another: International Child Adoptions, Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court and War in Iraq. Why did Romania decide to align sometimes with the US and other times with European countries? This paper uses the explanatory power of three leading theories of international relations to explain this puzzle. Firstly, it shows that systemic forces of power relations are suitable for explaining state behaviour, but only in security-related matters (neo-realism). Secondly, it shows that public opinion is not translated into government policy either because public interest is lacking or information about public's preferences is not available (liberalism). Thirdly, it shows how inter-subjectively shared meanings, identity recognition and socialisation of new norms offer the most compelling explanations about Romania's behaviour in the four situations of transatlantic divergences (constructivism).

Keywords: transatlantic relations, International Criminal Court, Iraq, Romanian foreign policy

1. INTRODUCTION

   Rejoining the transatlantic family after almost 50 years on the dark side of the Iron Curtain did not bring Romania the desired peace of mind. As certain American and European international policies became excruciatingly divergent, Romania (like many other former communist countries in the region) was caught in the middle and pressured to take one side or another.

   This paper tries to answer key questions such as 'What prompted Romania to align sometimes with the US and other times with the EU when these two major allies defended antagonistic positions?', 'Did Romania take a course of action out of fear of losing the support of the stronger ally or fear of being confronted with retaliatory measures?', 'Did Romania cunningly calculate the costs and benefits of each action in order to maximise the benefits?' or 'Were Romania's policy decisions the projection of an ongoing process of societal transformation or the manifestation of evolving identities and interests?'. There are few research papers addressing these questions, situation which allowed unsubstantiated and inconsistent interpretations dominate our understanding of Romanian foreign policy.

   Before answering these questions, I first describe briefly the context in which Romanian foreign policy making takes place. I look at Romania's past and present stances in foreign affairs, I try to determine what role Russia still plays in Romania's foreign policy making (if any) and I analyse the nature and gravity of transatlantic divergences. Subsequently, I employ the explanatory power of three dominant IR theories (neo-realism, liberalism and constructivism) in order to generate explanations about the Romanian foreign policy in four case studies where American and European stances clashed and Romania had to support one side or another (International Child Adoptions, Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court and War in Iraq).

2. THE CONTEXT OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

   Communist and post-communist years

   Romania's foreign policy under the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was famous for its anti-Soviet features, which made Romania an awkward partner of the West (especially of the US) and a unique case of communist-capitalist fusion in the international affairs of those times. Despite the dreadful nature of its domestic politics, Romania was shown 'a world-wide respect it had seldom enjoyed in its history' for 'splendid performances' abroad (Brown, 1988: 263; Shafir, 1985: 193). This aspect is of particular significance for the purpose of this paper as it indicates that Romania's relations with the transatlantic community were not completely frozen during its communist history.

   The discourse of Romanian foreign policy makers during the postcommunist period did not only catalyse the undisputed choice for a Euro-Atlantic agenda but also constructed Romania's identity in relation 'to the other' Russia and the Balkans (Hosu, 2002: 1-17). Romania used its status of "European" or "Western" or "Latin" to send a clear message that Romania's place in the transatlantic community was a natural phenomenon. During the transition from a former communist country to a member of this community (to which it should have always been part had the country not tragically fallen under Soviet influence), Romania defined her "self" as Central European, alongside the other aspirants to NATO and EU membership. Romanian politicians rejected the pejorative labels of "Eastern European" or "Balkan" country, from fear of being perceived still under Russia's dominance or part of the instability generated by Yugoslavia's disintegration.

   What Role does Russia (still) Play?

   I argue that Romania's negative representation of Russia plays a significant part in the shaping of the country's attitude towards the transatlantic community. The main argument is that perennial perceived fear of Russia, even in the post-communist period, determines Central Eastern European countries like Romania to desperately seek protection under the transatlantic umbrella by alienating Russia from Europe and by emphasising their 'European-ness' as opposed to Russia's lack of 'European-ness' (Roberts 1964: 361).

   A rich literature on [Central/Eastern] European--Russian dichotomy, brilliantly reviewed by Iver Neumann, explains the persistence of the fear of Russia among countries situated in its close vicinity, fear which is sometimes difficult to understand by countries situated in the West. Some authors present Europe by opposition to Russia not just in terms of geography but also in terms of Europe's sedentary and superior civilisation vis-a-vis Russia's nomadic and barbarian nature (de Reynold, 1950: 25-8). Milan Kundera saw Central Europe under the Soviet occupation as 'un occident kidnape'. Central Europe was 'a part of the West occupied by Russians, [a] European civilisation ... under siege by Soviet barbarians', the main trait identifying them as barbarians being their 'totalitarian', 'authoritarian', 'despotic' and 'offensive' political-economic system (Kundera, 1984: 33-8; Neumann, 1999: 103-12).

   In Kundera's view 'Russia is not just one more European power, but as a singular civilisation, an other civilisation, [the] totalitarian Russian civilisation is the radical negation of the modern West' (1984: 36). Mihaly Vajda went even further writing that Russians finally took the decision to become non-Europeans in the last decades and that 'Russians are incapable of tolerating another civilisation, an other form of life' (Vajda, 1989: 170-3). Referring to Central Europe, Kundera points out that the tragedy of the countries from this region derive precisely from being the neighbours of the Soviet Union [Russia] 'in whose brotherly embrace [they] gasp for breath' (Neumann, 1999: 151). In addition, there is a temptation to 'play up the alterity of Russia in order to increase the integration of the European self' (Neumann, 1999: 110-2).

   More recently, scholars have emphasised that while countries in the West saw post-Cold War threats shifting to issues like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and 'other dangers that emanate from beyond Europe's borders', Eastern European countries saw NATO membership 'as protection against a resurgent Russia', continuing 'to think of security in terms of territorial defence'. 'Rather then relying on military power, as his Soviet predecessors did, Vladimir Putin has sought to use economic instruments, above all energy exports, [...] to restore Russian influence in Eastern Europe' (Larrabee, 2006: 117-131).

   Transatlantic Divergences--Irreversible or Not?

   I argue that different perceptions of threats are central in explaining both transatlantic divergences and Romania's attitudes when such divergences occur. Robert Kagan (2003) claims that Europe cannot match the American military might, but is also unwilling to spend as much as the US spends on its military capabilities, despite the fact that Europe's economy is stronger than ever. Europe's economic power was not translated into strategic and geo-political power. Kagan believes that weaker states tend to perceive threats to international security from a less dramatic angle. In consequence, Europe is inclined to use cultural and ideological means (soft power) and less forceful diplomatic tools, giving priority to negotiations, strengthening of commercial ties and international law over the use of military force and hard power. Nevertheless, we can argue that the US believes Europe enjoys this luxury only because European diplomacy is ultimately backed by US (not European) hard power.

   Besides power disparities, Kagan gives two more explanations. The antiwar psychology is deeply engrained in Europe's societies, as a result of the ravages of the two World Wars. Europe became war-phobic and systematically against any prospects for future wars. Another explanation is that Europe is too inward looking, not paying too much attention to outside problems, because Europe is kept busy with a difficult and heavy integration agenda.

   Some scholars suggest that 'today, it is doubtful whether we can talk of a [transatlantic security community] with the same degree of confidence' (Cox, 2005: 209), proclaiming thus the end of Atlanticism, while others believe that that 'the recent strains over the Atlantic, [which] all solved peacefully if at times painfully, do not signal the demise of the transatlantic security community but, instead, empirically demonstrate how alive and well it is' (Pouliot, 2006: 119).

   Pouliot believes that 'in any security community there are countries that (willingly or not) dictate the norms and identities, and there are others that follow the lead' and that the 'power politics of peace' is a healthy and...