Party-based Euro-skepticism in Germany.

• Author: Hartleb, Florian
• Position: Essay

Abstract: For some authors, Euro-skepticism represents one of the great recipes for success of the new anti-establishment parties in European Union opposing Europeanization and globalization and occupying some policy fields along the globalism-nationalism cleavage (Frolich-Steffen/Rensmann 2007: 124). This article describes how and to which extent Euro-skepticism plays a role in the German party system. The article considers whether the term genuinely suits the criteria of a right-wing populist party and the role of Euro-skepticism in the German party system in general.

Keywords: Euro-skepticism, populism, Germany, right wing, CSU, NPD, BfB, PDS

Introduction

The paper examines four cases of party-based Euro-skepticism. Firstly, the Christian Social Union (CSU) as an established party and secondly comes a small party, Union of Free Citizens (BfB), as an example to establish a strictly Euro-skeptical party. Then I will comment on the new developments of the left side in the political sphere. Finally, I will discuss the National-democratic Party of Germany (NPD) on the extreme right side of the political spectrum. Some authors describe the identity crisis in the enlarged EU. The Hungarian political scientist Attila Agh speaks about a "recent value war on EU" between Euroskeptics and Euro-supporters. For him, the EU issue has become one of the most controversial topics in the media and also in the parliamentary debates (Agh 2006: 269). The article tests his observations in regarding the German party system.

1. Definition: party-based Euro-skepticism as indicator for populism

   Populism has a chameleonic quality, which leads to controversial debates among journalists, politicians and scholars. Populists have been portrayed as dupes, democrats and demons (Taggart 2000: 10). The characteristics of populism as a political formula, poses some problems for its use as a scientific term. Some approaches consider populism as a type of organization or a style of political communication (Canovan 1999: 3-4; Jagers/ Walgrave 2007: 321-325). A cross-section of the definitions found in the relevant literature reveals that it appeals to "ordinary people" and criticizes the "Establishment" (Canovan 1981: 13; Taguieff 2002: 110-117). It becomes clear that, on the basis of this definition, the most widely diverse groups, individuals, ideologies, behaviour patterns and forms of expression can be categorised as being "populist" (Ionesco/Gellner 1969). Generally there is a tension between populism and constitutional democracy: populism challenges constitutional democracy with many checks and balances from the democracy itself and promotes restoring power to the people (Abts/Rummens 2007: 410). Regarding the parties, scholars speaks of an "anti-political-establishment party" (Schedler 1996). Accordingly, before the term could be meaningfully employed, it must be chronologically, spatially and materially restricted. The concept of "new rightwing populism" serves this purpose well. In fact the most visible presence of populism has been through the far right where a number of political parties with charismatic, media seeking leaders have achieved their breakthrough in Western democracies, from the mid-1980s onwards (Decker 2004).

   Populist movements exploiting this type of situation have long existed--we only need to think of the Populist Party, which emerged in the United States in the late nineteenth century and after which the phenomenon has been named, or of the Poujadistes in the Fourth French Republic (Priester 2007: 142-158). However, each of these movements took shape in a specific place at a particular time, whereas today's modernisation processes are occurring in a world in which economical, cultural and political problems affect societies more and more (Meny/Surel 2000). That is the main reason for the parallel nature of the changes in the party-political landscapes in various countries and also helps to explain why the new populists have not disappeared from the political arena as observers back in the 1980s had expected.

   Of the many European cases, examples are Jean Marie Le Pen's Front National in France, Jorg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria, Umberto Bossi's Northern League in Italy, and the brief eruption in the Netherlands of a movement led by Pim Fortuyn. They all have tended to mobilize resentments in the sense of exclusion. The main reason why such an 'exclusion mentality' is associated with the ideological Right is not its reactionary nature, but its anti-egalitarian element (Betz 2004: 23-50). In regards of contents the so-called "charismatic parties" (Pedahzur/Brichta, 2002) are often skeptical as regards immigration or the European Union. They often promise social gratifications or simply security, a homogeneous society protected of multiculturalism and economical globalization. The parties left the former partial neoliberal agenda (Kitschelt 1995), shifting to social protectionism. The state should, by laws and order measures, protect its citizens--in a world of crime, immigration and elitist networking. In recent years, the European integration has developed to an important mobilizing issue of the new right-wing challenger parties connecting EU with loss of social welfare, national identity and crisis of political representation (Decker 2006: 15).

   This, however, does not preclude the existence of left-wing populism (Dereymez 2003; Hartleb 2004). Like right-wing populists, those on the Left cultivate anti-elitist sentiments, opposition to the system and defence of the "common people". Unlike the populists on the Right, however, they do not extend the exclusion principle horizontally, instead they remain loyal to their egalitarian ideals and tend to be liberal, even libertarian, on value issues. Regarding Euro-skepticism, the two sides consequently exist: the right side is much more aggressive, criticizes European integration because of immigration and lost of national identity. The left side does not attack European integration, but tendencies like the enforcement of economical globalization within the European Union. In my definition, populist parties characterize a leader figure, which expresses a rejection of representative party democracy in favour of decision-making by a majority of the people. At the same time, populist agitation reflects opposition to the establishment. Populist parties are not necessarily antidemocratic and do not necessarily articulate stands that are in disagreement to the constitution (Backes 2001: 21).

   The dimension of Euro-skepticism discussed as a potential concept in political science (Benedetto/Quaglia 2007: 478-484) appears to different extent, both on the left and right side of politics, between Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists and Euroskeptics, taking into account the concept of "political culture" (Kopecky/Mudde 2002: 303). The enlargement of European Union caused debates not only in the new member states, but also in Western Europe: Charles de Gaulle or Margaret Thatcher have the public face of Euro-skeptical politicians (Tiemann 2006: 171). Some party movements, especially on the new populist right, have "Europe" as one of their primary targets (Benedetto/Quaglia 2007: 483). Hard Euro-skepticism rejects the whole concept of the European integration. Soft Euro-skepticism is where there is no objection to the European integration process of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU's planned trajectory based on further extension of competencies (Szczerbiak/ Taggart 2003). The concept of Euroskepticism is linked with the recent debates over the future of European Union and some categories such as Europe in a wide sense, certain policies (including social and economic policies) and the institution "European Union". The weakness of using the term demonstrates linking every argument against the new institutional reforms of European Union with the label "Euro-skepticism", also the absence of historical and social background (see for this point Mink 2007).

2. The example of the Christian Social Union (CSU)

   The Christian Social Union (CSU), successful as regional party in Bavaria, is not a typical populist party. It has been in power there since 1946--2003 with a two-thirds majority--and an influential size in the national parliament and the current Grand Coalition government. The party proclaims to embody the Bavarian identity reflecting the own political culture there (Mintzel 1999). The attitudes towards the European integration are shaped through the Bavarian and national background. The party tends to integrate Euro-skeptical views and sentiments among the electorate. The 2004 European election campaign was entitled: "Think European, live Bavarian". For the party, the issues of the European Union are not considered highest priority.

   Three major topics are reviewed as decisive: the global security, economic growth and the role of regions in Europe. The emphasis on the role of regions is clear because of the fact that Bavaria with its rural structure and tradition has got a larger territory unit than Denmark, the Netherlands or Belgium. Regarding European integration, the party criticized few points. A good example is the stand took against the European Monetary Union: Edmund Stoiber, the long-standing party's leader (from January 1993 until 2007), distrusted the economic reforms and the fast introduction of the Euro. Also, the CSU speaks about the democratic deficit and the elitism of the European Union, but very strong in a symbolic way (see for the whole aspect Wagemann 2005: 181-184). Edmund Stoiber said also clearly that Turkey should not become an ordinary member of the European Union (Stoiber 2007: 15-16). The 2004 European election campaign of CSU concentrated on Turkey question as polarizing and mobilizing issue--in difference to "sister party" CDU. But the issue did not play a decisive role from voters' view...