When the East goes West: Romanian migrants in Italy or how to deal with mobility issues in the EU 27.

• Author: Domnar, Anca Oprisor
• Position: Report

1. INTRODUCTION

   Central as it is to the common market, as one of the four fundamental freedoms of the Union, the free movement of persons has proved somewhat more problematic than the others (Postelnicu, 2007). This may be in part because 'people raise security and welfare implications in a way that goods do not' (Barnard 2007: 252).The Eastern enlargement has brought wide concerns related to the potential economic and social effects in the older EU states. Recent legislation in Italy has gravely obstructed the implementation of EU rights concerning free movement and residence, while bringing to the surface some of the wider problems connected to the management of migration and mobility in the EU 27 context.

   The violent murder of Giovanna Reggiani in November 2007 by a Romanian citizen of Roma origin sent Italian public opinion into flames and highlighted the widely believed connection between immigration and crime. From that moment on the topic received intensive coverage, leading to a general criminalization of immigrants and in particular those of Romanian and especially of Roma origin. A 'Romania emergency' was installed, as it was called by Walter Veltroni, the mayor of Rome at that time (Wagner 2009: 11). The theme was also picked up by the right-wing coalition in the elections of spring 2008, which is said to owe its victory particularly to its strong anti-immigrant discourse. Immediately after coming to power the new government resolved to fulfil its promises and approved the 'security package', a set of legislative decrees meant to deal with the increased number of migrants and especially with those (mostly irregular) migrants living in settlements around Italian cities. De facto, the package targeted the Romanian community in Italy (and within it, the Roma), which is currently the largest foreign group in the country and which is generally believed to be responsible for the increase in crime rates.

   The package seems to be one of the strictest policy reactions to migration since Italy has become a receiving country. In addition, its measures cover several categories of migrants, including internal EU movers and in fact contradicting EU Directive 2004/38 on the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the Union. In this context, the question of migration management goes beyond the bilateral relation between Romania and Italy and becomes a matter of European relevance.

   The following paper will analyze the Italian 'security package' within the framework of EU mobility and it will look in particular at its implications for Romanian individuals in Italy in their capacity as EU citizens. The paper is based on a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. Starting from an analysis of official data regarding migration flows into Italy and various accounts of migration management in the country it will continue with a review of internal and EU legislation to determine the fit of the 'security package' with the European framework. In addition, semi-structured interviews with migration experts and policy makers acquainted with the crisis have helped the author paint a more vivid picture of the implications of this national crisis on the wider European scene.

2. EXPLAINING MOBILITY

   1. The EU Legislative Framework for the Freedom of Movement

      Much of the debate on modern migration has been built around a state-centred perspective, which deems the migrant as a 'threat' to the status-quo (Joppke 1998). From here stem two distinct views on migration: one concerned with immigration and the policies that regulate the entry and stay of migrants; and the second focusing on the immigrants, or rather their integration in host societies once they are within the borders of the polity (in Lahav and Guiraudon 2006: 203). Or, as Sasse and Thielemann frame it, there is a tension between a security-based and a rights-based approach (2005). Recently, new perspectives are challenging the traditional stance, by invoking 'transnational' (Faist 2000) and 'post-national' trends and identities (Soysal 1994) as a result of globalization and accompanying phenomena (see also Sassen 1996). The integration logic of the EU follows to a certain extent on this trail and introduces the concept of intra-EU mover, a hybrid, 'tertium genus in-between internal and international migrants' (Recchi 2006: 4). A distinction is made between the internal migrant and the third-country national and while the EU migration approach towards TCNs is still quite blurry, the legal status of internal migrants is solidly established. It is this framework of inner mobility that I will try to present shortly in the following section. Freedom of movement will be regarded from the wider perspective of European citizenship and not as work migration.

      Abolishing obstacles to internal migration in the Union has been a goal of the EU Treaties starting with the '50s (Barnard 2007: 249). Freedom of movement was initially meant to support work migrants and had a clear economic rationale in aiding the single market integration. Secondary legislation has moved gradually to enlarge the scope of this freedom to other categories of persons in the Union, such as students or retired people (see for example the three Residence Directives adopted by the Commission in 1990). It is only with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the formalization of a European citizenship that the freedom to move and reside freely is granted as a political right to all citizens of Member States, whether economically active or not (Craig and de Burca 2008).

      Moreover, in 2004, the Directive 2004/38/EC, also called the 'Citizens' Directive' has been adopted to create 'a single legal regime for free movement and residence in the context of citizenship of the Union while maintaining the acquired rights of workers' (Craig and de Burca 2008: 870). According to the Directive citizens of the Union may reside in any country of the EU for a period of three months without being subjected to any formalities. States may ask for additional conditions from citizens wishing to reside for more than three months: individuals and their family members need to be engaged in economic activity; or have sufficient means and sickness insurance; or be enrolled at a private or public establishment, have comprehensive sickness insurance cover and are self-sufficient in order to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host member state.

      As long as residents do not become an unreasonable burden for the state's welfare system, they should not be expelled (Kostakopoulou 2008: 292). The only grounds for restrictive actions may be public policy, public security and public health. Any such barriers to the freedom of movement should however comply with the principle of proportionality, meaning that the action is appropriate to the goal that needs to be achieved and that there is no other less intrusive action that can be taken to reach that goal (Barnard 2007: 81). It should also be based on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, if indeed he or she represents 'a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society' (Art. 27) (Merlino 2009: 18).

      Within the scope of the Directive, foreign nationals enjoy equal rights with the locals and discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited. In a nutshell, this means that EU nationals 'should be able to exercise their rights to free movement without impediments imposed by additional regulations adopted by other member states' (Kostakopoulou 2008: 288).

   2. Freedom of Movement post 2004/7

      While the right to move and reside freely in the Union is fully applicable for members in recent accession countries, the freedom of work was temporarily restricted to respond to member state fears that their labour markets would be flooded with immigrant workers from the East (Craig and de Burca 2008: 788). The two-three-two formula allowed 'old' Member States to restrict access on their labour markets for workers from the eight new entrants (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus) for a period of up to seven years. In 2004 only three states opened their labour markets: Ireland, the UK and Sweden. Currently eleven out of fifteen countries had opened their markets, while the rest maintained more or less simplified measures. On 30th April 2009, the transitional agreements for the EU8 should end, unless special disturbances of Member State labour markets will prevent this.

      After 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria entered the Union ten out of the twenty-five States opened their labour markets, while the other chose to maintain some restrictions. Currently, fourteen of the EU-25 Member States have opened their labour markets completely to the last two entrants (1).

      Current impact evaluations made by the Commission sCOM(2008)765 finalt show that most work migrants from the EU-8 have preferred the UK and Germany as a destination, whereas the two later entrants have rather gone to Spain and Italy, which absorbed 50% and 25% respectively of the Romanian and Bulgarian migrants. Overall, the number of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens resident in the EU-25 increased from around 690 000 at the end of 2003 to about 1.8 million at the end of 2007. As the Commission points out, this process started well before the 2007 accession sCOM(2008)765 final: 5t. Also, it appears that 'in almost all Member States the number of recent arrivals from non-EU countries exceeds the number of newcomers from other EU Member States' (ibid: 6). Even after the Eastern enlargement, intra-EU mobility remains low relative to other regions (2).

3. ACCOMODATING MIGRATION

   1. Modern (Im)Migration To Italy

      Italy shares to a great extent the common traits of the Mediterranean immigration regime (Baldwin-Edwards 1997). It is a recent country of immigration, still building up the institutional structures necessary to manage the progressive inflows...