The political economy of Turkey's eastern turn: an empirical analysis of Erdogan's State visits (2003-2010).

• Author: Ekmekci, Faruk
• Position: POLSCI PAPERS - Recep T. Erdogan - Report

Introduction

Turkey has experienced significant changes in its domestic and international politics since the 'post-Islamist' Justice and Development Party (AdaletveKalkinmaPartisi, hereafter AKP) came to power in late 2002. The AKP government improved relations with several non-Western countries (most notably, with Syria, Iran, and Russia) and downgraded relations with Israel, a close US ally. Turkish economy has also been more 'Easternized' during the AKP rule with the declining share of the European Union in Turkish trade.

What explains Turkey's 'Eastern turn' in the first two terms of the AKP rule? Two competing explanations are ideology and economy. Wary of the post-Islamist turn of the AKP leadership, some analysts argued that Turkey's Eastern turn is driven by the AKP's 'hidden' Islamic agenda (see, among others, Pollack 2005, Cagaptay 2009, Cohen 2009, and Rubin 2010). Turkey's improving relations with Eastern countries on the one side and declining relations with Israel on the other led those analysts to the conclusion that Turkey, under the governance of ex-Islamists, is moving away from the West, the political and cultural beacon of the secular founding fathers of Turkey. An alternate group of scholars (particularly Kirisci 2009 and 2011, but also Tsarouhas 2009 and Logan 2009) argued that as a result of changes in Turkey's domestic and international economic relations, Turkey has transformed into a 'trading state'. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy is guided to a greater extent by economic considerations such as trade, export markets, foreign direct investment, and energy security. According to this group of scholars, Turkey's improving relations with the non-Western world is driven more by a sensible economic rationale than by ideological orientation.

No systematic empirical test of these arguments has been made so far. In this article, we aim to fill this gap and make a quantitative test of hypotheses driven from these two competing arguments using state visits of Turkish Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan to foreign countries between 2003 and 2010. We first provide a brief history of Turkey's relations with the West. Then, we outline some of the major changes in Turkish foreign relations in the first two terms of the AKP rule (20022011) and the two competing explanations regarding these changes. Next, using Poisson regression models, we analyze Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan's state visits to non-Western countries to see whether there is any particular trend away from pro-Western countries, which we fail to find. We conclude with an elaboration on the implications of our findings.

Turkey and the West

As a combined effect of their detestation of the Ottoman past, their contempt for the 'treacherous' Arab, and their admiration of the 'civilized' West, the founders of the Turkish Republic were staunchly pro-Western. They viewed the adoption of Western institutions and maintenance of cordial relations with the West as necessary instruments of securing Turkey's place among "civilized nations." Although the anti-imperial sentiments that were strong among the founders kept some distance between Turkey and the West in the early years of the Republic, the rise of the Soviet threat in the aftermath of the World War II led Turkey to solidify its military and economic ties with the Western world. Since then, Turkey has participated in almost every major Western political, economic, and military organization.

Turkish inclusion in the Western bloc during the Cold War helped Turkey maintain its territorial integrity. It also moved the Republic further in the direction of the "Westernization" ideal of its founding fathers. However, on the negative side, Cold War politics required Turkey to follow a passive and dependent policy. As it became obvious during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Turkey's inclusion in the superpower rivalry turned Turkey into a "subject of negotiations," (Criss 1997: 101). With the end of the Cold War, a greater sense of policy independence and activism has been witnessed in Turkish foreign policy, particularly during the Ozal era (Fuller 1997, Makovsky 1999). For the Turks, it was time for their country to take her "deserved place in the world" (Aydin 2005: 34).

During the AKP years since 2002, Turkey has followed a foreign policy that has sought a more active and leading role in world politics and a balance between Europe and Asia (Onis and Yilmaz 2009, Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010). Turkey's proactive policy included an impressive record of first-ever chairmanship in the Organization of the Islamic Conference since 2005, observer status in the African Union since 2005, 'permanent guest' status in the Arab League since 2006, co-sponsorship of the UN's Alliance of Civilizations initiative, membership in the UN Security Council, and third-party mediations between such diverse pair of countries as Israel-Syria, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Bosnia-Serbia, and the US-Iran. Although not giving up on the idea of EU-membership, the AKP governments have also worked for enhancing relations with non-European countries. Turkey experienced a remarkable improvement in its relations with countries like Russia, Syria, and Iran in the first two terms of the AKP rule.

The pro-active foreign policy of Turkey during the AKP years can be viewed as a continuation of Ozal's activism (Onis and Yilmaz 2009). Yet, whereas Ozal's activism remained more ideal than real, the AKP has been largely successful in turning Turkey's traditional enemies and threats into friends and partners. In the next section, we review some of the major changes in Turkish foreign relations during the AKP era.

Turkey's Changing East-West Balance in the AKP Era

Improving Relations with Syria, Iran, and Russia

Probably the most controversial aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era was Turkey's improving relations with some Eastern 'villains'. To the dismay of many in the West, Turkish relations with Syria, Iran, and Russia improved remarkably during the first two terms of the AKP rule (2002-2011). In particular, relations with Syria went through a dramatic recovery in that era. Turkey and Syria perceived one another as enemies and threats during most of the twentieth century. Syrian irredentist claims over Alexandretta (Hatay), disputes over sharing the waters of the Euphrates River, Syrian support of the PKK from 1980 to 1998, Turkey's recognition of Israel and later forming a strategic partnership with the number one enemy of the Arab states, and the two countries' siding with opposite camps during the Cold War were among the major reasons that prevented good neighborly relations between the two countries. The 1998 Adana Accords, which was signed a few days after the PKK leader Ocalan's extradition from Syria and in which Syria mainly agreed to end its support to the PKK, and the subsequent protocols on water-sharing in the following years started a new era of good neighborliness in Turkish-Syrian relations (Kibaroglu 2007: 188-189; Aras and Polat 2008: 509-510). Turkey's downgrading its strategic partnership with Israel and adopting a policy that sought a subtle balance between Israel and the Arab world after the AKP assumed power in 2002 made Turkey even dearer and more reliable in Damascus' eyes. By 2010, Turkish-Syrian relations were at a historical high point with rising trade ties, visa-free entries across the border, multiple security arrangements, and co-operation against the PKK (Aras and Polat 2008, Worth 2009). (2)

Turkey's relations with Iran also improved significantly during the first two terms of the AKP rule (2002-2011). With its enormous fossil fuel resources and large domestic market, Iran was an invaluable partner for the 'emerging' Turkish economy. (3) Turkish trade with Iran more than quadrupled between 2002 and 2010, with Turkish exports to Iran increasing more than six times. The two countries signed multiple energy agreements and Iran became Turkey's second-largest supplier of natural gas, after Russia (Larrabee 2010: 164-165). This rising economic interdependence between Turkey and Iran increased Turkish stakes in Iranian political stability. As a result, Turkey increased its efforts to prevent a military conflict between Iran and the United States (or Israel), which would have serious repercussions on the Turkish economy, and became a major mediator between Iran and the international community for the resolution of the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. (4)

After centuries of bitter enmity between the two nations, Turkish-Russian relations, too, improved strikingly in the last decade. As in the case of Iran, Russia's enormous energy resources and large market made her an invaluable partner for the 'emerging' Turkish economy. Russia's advanced military and nuclear technology gave an additional impetus for Turkey to enhance relations with Moscow. By 2010, Russia had become Turkey's largest trading partner, principal supplier of natural gas, and a major market for Turkey's construction industry, which is second largest in the world (Aras 2009; Larrabee 2010: 67-68). Burgeoning economic ties led the two countries to agree on lifting visa requirement for short-term entries. Russia and Turkey also signed in May 2010 a deal for building a nuclear power plant in the city of Mersin over seven years (Arsu 2010).

Rising Anti-Israeli Discourse

Another important change during the AKP era was deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations. Converging threat perceptions of Turkey and Israel regarding Syria, Iraq, and Iran resulted in a strategic partnership between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s (Bolukbasi 1999). The changing nature of Turkish politics and subsequent improvements in Turkey's relations with its Muslim neighbors resulted in the downgrading of this relationship, particularly in discourse. Erdogan has become one of the most vocal critics of Israel's policy towards Palestinians, charging Israel in several...