THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING PROCESSES IN CLUJ-NAPOCA.

• Author: Boc, Emil

1. Participatory budgeting - an instrument of economic and social development

   1.1. Promises and limitations of participatory budgeting processes

   Participatory budgeting (PB from here on) is a democratic instrument that is presented today in many forms. It has several definitions but, in essence, it represents a process by which the citizens are involved in the decision-making process regarding the way budgetary resources are allocated (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Participatory budgeting has seen a remarkable development over the past 20 years; many processes using this name have been carried out in different forms and with the support of various social and political actors, and this polymorphism was possible due to the evolution of the concept. Even though the initial model in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre remains an important point of reference, the policy of participatory governance is defined today in different forms (de Oliveira, 2017, p. 72).

   As Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) show, there are two stages in the evolution and spread of participatory budgeting (PB) globally. The process appeared in the late 1980s in Brazil, in the context of transition from dictatorship to democracy; PB was the center of a political strategy of the Worker's Party, a left-wing party, but with an eloquent ideological approach, that brought together a rather wide spectrum, from the social-democrats to left-wing radicals, a party that had strong ties with trade unions, community movements, and Brazilian organized civil society, all these movements reigning after the years of military dictatorship (Guidry, 2003, p. 84). In a country marked by profound inequalities, much greater than those that could be seen at the end of communism in the countries of Eastern Europe, PB was an instrument promising to bring social justice, good governance and, last but not least, votes for the Worker's Party. PB spread rapidly to Brazil and other South American countries.

   But, in the late 1990s, success led to a major change of approach as PB has come into international attention becoming a good practice considered appropriate to be replicated irrespective of the governing party, as well as in Brazil, where other parties continued the PB processes. Thus, the PB was separated from the initial idea that it was an 'institutional reform' and continued its global expansion with a politically neutral instrument, an instrument of 'good governance'. In the process of global expansion, PB has been adapted to local conditions and often combined with other participatory processes (Rocke, 2014, pp 4-5) and has acquired the ability to express different experiences and to attract different stakeholders.

   While the parties that originally supported PB saw the process as a contribution to the 'reconceptualization of socialism' (even though the idea of 'socialism' had different interpretations in the context, it had in its center the idea of 'social justice') 'development agencies see it as one among several tools for reconceptualizing development' (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 96). The adoption of PB as a neutral working tool contributed to the imposition of the view that participation is an important element for economic and social development and the idea that good governance is necessary for economic growth (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 96). Thus, the United Nations Development Program (1997) defines the following aspects as being characteristics of good governance: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness efficiency, accountability and strategic vision.

   However, the fact that PB is seen by development agencies and many local stakeholders as a neutral tool, it doesn't mean that all social actors see it that way; different views on what PB is or should be, views determined by a different ideological background, assumed publicly or not, lead to different interpretations and criticisms of PB processes. For example, debates on defining PBs are well known and debates whether a particular experience is a PB case or not follow. For many who practice it, the limit for tie-break is related to decision-making: is the decision made by the citizens 'binding' or is it 'advisory'?, while for others the limit has to do with the 'quality of participation' (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, pp. 8-9). Citizens are also preoccupied by the extent to which their participation is significant and will be taken into account by the authorities (Peixoto, 2008, p. 22).

   However, although PB processes are an element that supports 'political inclusion and greater social justice', they are neither a universal panacea, nor a solution without limitations (Wampler, 2007, pp. 45-47). One of the most common limitations comes from focusing (in the great majority of cases) on public infrastructure investments. Beyond the projects that immediately affect their lives, few participants are interested in public learning processes and wider public policies. Later, after a project is implemented, the pressing need disappears and the number of participants decreases because participation tends to be stimulated by obtaining specific resources and goods rather than public learning. There are also budget programs related to broader public policies, such as those related to education, but these are fewer. Also, the tendency to focus on short- and medium-term infrastructure projects is the difficulty of generating debates about the future of the city. Another limitation comes from the dependency on authorities' commitment. Although the actors of the civil society are important, the success of participatory budgeting programs is due to the commitment of the political leaders who are governing. Another limitation comes from focusing the debates on local issues, as these programs are usually run by local authorities, while solutions to major issues the communities are facing may be at the regional or national level. If the economic and social exclusion is a structural one, the possibilities for action at local level are limited; and there is a need for socio-economic reforms and actions that go beyond the PB field and what such a process might be reasonably expected to achieve. Furthermore, the danger of manipulating the entire process cannot be ruled out: mainly by the mayor and other local elected representatives, but also by civil society leaders who want to impose their agenda (there is also the possibility that some NGOs or other social movements do not support the organization of a PB process because they perceive it as a threat to their role in the local governance system).

   We know from Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-1840/2017) that a strong associative life is an element that favors the participation of citizens in public affairs. Studies on participative processes show that the existence of a strong organized civil society creates a good environment for participative processes and innovations (Mansuri and Rao, 2013, p. 289; Berman, 2017, p. 205) and participative budgeting processes are a model of co-governance, whose favorable premises are also constituted by political support and a strong civil society (Rocke, 2014, p. 175).

   Although PB provides many examples of remarkable achievements as a community development tool (such as redirecting public resources to the poorest areas that are most in need of intervention, increasing transparency and accountability of the authorities, expanding public services delivery, stimulating the development of civil society's organizations, increasing the democratic representation of some previously excluded categories, increasing trust between authorities and citizens) these favorable results are by no means guaranteed by the development of some participatory budgeting processes and even successful cases can show some contradictory results (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 98). When public space becomes open to debate and citizens have a say outside the classical frameworks of representative democracy, the different logic of participation, representation and expert knowledge can collide even in the best organized participatory processes (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p. 8).

   Considering that all public participation processes increasingly use online tools (Nabatchi and Leighninger, 2015, p. 5), participatory budgeting processes are no exception, starting with Brazil, at Ipatinga since 2000 (Wampler, 2010, pp. 133-134), such instruments are being used...