The Armistice Convention Dated September 12TH, 1944 and the Repatriation of the Romanian Prisoniers from the U.S.S.R. in International Relation

Author:Stefan Gheorghe
Position:Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania
Pages:480-486
SUMMARY

The differences of opinion between the Romanian government and the Soviet representatives from the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission would highlight the mistrust of both parties in the possibility of solving the problems deriving from their own application and interpretation of the Armistice Convention text. Keywords: Armistice Convention; unconditional surrender; surrender conditions; Romanian... (see full summary)

 
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European Integration - Realities and Perspectives. Proceedings 2019
480
The Armistice Convention Dated September 12th, 1944 and the
Repatriation of the Romanian Prisoniers from the U.S.S.R. in International Relation
Stefan Gheorghe1
Abstract: The differences of op inion between the Romanian government and the Soviet representatives from the Allied
(Soviet) Control Commission would highlight the mistrust of both parties in the possibility of solving the problems deriving
from their own application and interpretation of the Armistice Convention text.
Keywords: Armistice Convention; unconditional surrender; surrender conditions; Romanian prisoniers; allied prisoners
The Armistice Convention concluded between Romania, on the one hand and the United Nations, on
the other hand, was not the document long waited by the Romanian authorities and opposition during
the secret negotiations in Cairo, Ankara or Stockholm, according to many Romanian politicians. The
“unconditional surrender” formula, adopted on January 24th, 1943, in Casablanca, would have as
purpose preparing the governments of the states at war with the United Nations on the treatment and
conditions their countries would be subjected to, regardless of the moment and causes that would lead
to their exit from the battle.
The surrender conditions meant for Romania, among other things, the demobilization and disarmament,
the handing over of war material, damages, etc., all of which would be imposed upon the will of the
three Great Powers, being “mainly designed to ensure security and to continue the war against Germany,
objectives that were considered to have important political implications”2. Romania’s international
political position in the first days after the palace coup on August 23rd and after changing sides against
Germany was that of an “independent state that led a war against its former allies, on its former enemies’
side” (Deletant, 1997, p. 40), having a share of the territory occupied from military point of view. When
entering Bucharest, the Soviet army would find an independent government capable and willing to sign
the armistice, having as its main strengths the neutralization of the German troops by their own means
and the liberation of an important part of the national territory (Quinlan, 1995, pp. 98-99). If the Soviets
had had some other plans (Şperlea, 1997, p. 47) with Romania (Duţu, Dobre & Loghin, 1997, pp. 198-
201), they would be tangled by the action of King Mihai, who had managed to change the course of
events by arresting the marshal himself. The intention of the new Romanian authorities was to sign the
agreement with the United Nations as soon as possible, in order to avoid placing the entire country under
the control and military occupation of the Red Army.
The task of the new government was even more pressing as the Soviet armies, especially their leaders,
treated the country as a territory occupied by fights. And the Soviets wanted, in a first phase, to speed
1 Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd., Galati, 800654, Romania, Tel.:
+40372361102, Corresponding author: stefangheorghe@univ-danubius.ro.
2 See (23 august 1944. Documente/23 August 1944. Documents, vol 1, pp. 66-70).

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