Strategic or identity-based Euroscepticism? The Euro discourse of Vaclav Klaus.

• Jurisdiction: Rumania
• Date: 22 June 2014
• Author: Hlousek, Vit

Introduction

The study of Euroscepticism to this point has taken place largely in research on political parties and public behaviour. There is a substantial body of work which has found that Euroscepticism is employed either as a strategic tool or as an important factor in constructing the actor's identity. Less attention has been paid to individual politicians, probably because not many have held influential executive positions. But as Euroscepticism has transformed into a "persistent phenomenon" (Usherwood & Startin 2013) in the modern EU, there has been an increasing emergence of mainstream politicians betting on the Eurosceptical card. The study of these individual politicians and the scope and manner of their use of Euroscepticism in their political entrepreneurship is thus increasingly relevant, not only as regards the study of Euroscepticism itself, but also as it impacts upon European integration.

Since the overall momentum of Euroscepticism has gained across Europe in recent years, it is also important to determine if this increase is connected to the use of Euroscepticism as a strategic tool or whether it foreshadows changes in the ideological treatment of European integration. Generally speaking, the emergence of Euroscepticism is understood in these two ways--either as a product of government/opposition competition, particularly linked to the politics of opposition, or as a phenomenon with deeper roots grounded in the ideological preferences of actors.

This article analyses the discourse of Vaclav Klaus on European integration during his tenure in office as president of the Czech Republic. During this period, covering the years 2003-2013, Klaus returned to executive power after having previously served as Chair of the House of Deputies, a purely symbolic function. It is important to stress that Klaus was elected president with a reputation as a Eurosceptical politician. Our research questions are therefore as follows: (1) Did Vaclav Klaus set aside his Eurosceptical views when he was elected President? If not, (2) how might his views on the EU during his first term be interpreted? Did he incline towards soft Euroscepticism, or are his views better described using the category of hard Euroscepticism? With the re-election of Klaus to a second term in 2008, we also ask (3) whether his approach towards the EU changed during the 2008-2013 period or if it remained the same as in his first term.

What does this paper wish to say? Firstly, we would like to identify whether Vaclav Klaus used Euroscepticism as a strategic tool or whether his stance was in fact a consequence of his wider take on politics. This is a valuable goal, because it helps us better understand the role Euroscepticism plays in political entrepreneurship. Secondly, we believe an in-depth analysis of Klaus's approach to the EU is valuable in and of itself. Although the Czech constitution officially treats the office of president as a symbolic one, Czech tradition dating back to the period of the so-called First Republic accords the office more power. This understanding of the position of president was reinforced in 2013, when the president was elected by direct vote for the first time.

We will attempt to answer these three questions using the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), applied to Klaus's discourse on the EU's common currency, the euro. We believe the operationalization of European integration in terms of the euro issue is acceptable and suitable. First, the euro possesses both political and economic dimensions to do with European integration and therefore attitudes towards it represent a complex opinion on the European integration. This can be hardly claimed about any other EU policy or activity as e. g. common agriculture policy or the Constitutional Treaty. They are either very specific as the former or time sensitive as the later. Second, due to the economic crisis, the euro has been a persistent topic shaping both Czech and European political debate in recent years. In addition, the application of a discourse analytical approach requires a limited amount of text and topics. The focus will be on selected texts produced by Klaus himself, the influence of a changing political context and on analysing the discourse tools and practices used by Klaus to criticize the common currency project. The analytical framework used in the paper is built on the concept of Euroscepticism as defined in the research tradition on political parties.

The paper will be organized as follows: First we introduce the concept of Euroscepticism and briefly review the basic directions research into it has taken. This enables us to construct our own theoretical framework, both in terms of the Eurosceptical content expected and its motivation. Afterwards, we review the research on Vaclav Klaus. This section is important not only because of the need to summarize the current state of research, but also because it helps us identify the main points of Klaus's general ideological stance. Then we briefly introduce the method of discourse analysis and describe our data. Next, Klaus's texts, speeches and discursive praxis are analysed and compared with expected values concerning the content and motivation of his approach towards the euro. We conclude by summarizing our findings, discussing them in the context of existing research.

Euroscepticism in theory and practice

The concept of Euroscepticism to this point has been developed as a phenomenon of influence over the general public (McLaren 2007, Sorensen 2008) or particularly over party competition (Taggart 1998, Sitter 2001, Kopecky & Mudde 2002, Conti 2003, Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008b). While the initial stream of research into Euroscepticism focused primarily on its sources (i.e., what gives rise to a Eurosceptical stance), later work has paid more attention to categorizing Euroscepticism and attempting to differentiate it within the various forms of EU critique. Both kinds of conceptualization have now existed for quite some time, leading to many (probably too many) concepts and definitions of Euroscepticism.

Starting with the party-based tradition, probably the more influential strain of theorizing about Euroscepticism, the conceptualization made by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart seems to have won the day. Their conceptualization distinguishes between soft and hard versions of Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is considered to be "principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to [a] supranational institution such as the EU". Soft Euroscepticism then becomes an attitude in which "there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make" (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008b: 247).

Research into Euroscepticism by members of the public has focused much more on the cause of the Eurosceptical stance. Differing authors lay varying emphases on particular factors or motivations. In many cases, these factors may be complementary rather than exclusive. For example, McLaren distinguishes economic, cultural and institutional factors and finds that national identities which are particularly exclusive motivate Euroscepticism. Sorensen, in her analysis of Euroscepticism by members of the public in three EU states (United Kingdom, France and Denmark) takes four types of Euroscepticism into account: sovereignty-based, economic, democratic and political. The first variety especially reacts to the transfer of political power from the national state to the supranational centre. Economic Euroscepticism evaluates the EU on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. The Democratic type, the third potential expression of Euroscepticism, lays its focus on a critical approach to the way the EU political system functions. And finally, political Euroscepticism emphasizes ideology and its in/compatibility with the integration process.

Aside from the categorization and definition of Euroscepticism, intensive debate has arisen around the question of why any particular political party adopts a Eurosceptical stance. Two basic positions may be identified here. The first of these finds the explanation in strategic behaviour shaped by domestic political competition (Sitter 2001, Sitter--Batory 2008). In this sense, Euroscepticism is a product of opposition-coalition relations. As a result, soft Eurosceptics, in particular, may change their critique once they enter the government (Mikkel--Kasekamp 2008). The opposing approach maintains that perception of the EU is firmly rooted in ideology. It thus holds across time and space, reflecting a set of stable preferences regarding European integration (Lees 2008).

Theoretical research on the degree, content and motivation of Euroscepticism has seen significant disputes. The popular Taggart and Szczerbiak typology has been criticized repeatedly, especially over the 'soft Euroscepticism' category. (5) There is also no general agreement on what gives rise to a Eurosceptical stance and if a single set of decisive factors may be identified (Taggart--Szczerbiak 2008b). Despite this theoretical lack of clarity, we believe the existing Euroscepticism research tradition to be useful and better than a generalized non-theoretical conceptualization of the phenomenon. (6) Our analysis of Klaus's discourse thus takes into account both theoretical questions--the degree of Euroscepticism present and its motivation. The inclusion of both questions in a single study is necessary to identify whether Klaus as President was a Eurosceptic heretic and, if so, why he adopted this stance. Thus, as a first step, we adopt the Taggart and Szczerbiak typology of soft and hard Euroscepticism. Their...