Romania and the Armistice with the United Nations in International Relations

• Author: Stefan Gheorghe
• Position: Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania
• Pages: 474-479

European Integration - Realities and Perspectives. Proceedings 2019

474

Romania and the Armistice with the

United Nations in International Relations

Stefan Gheorghe1

Abstract: Romania’s changing sides on August 23rd to the United Nations would bring the Romanian state back into the “large

team of democratic states” only for a short period of time. The international position of the newly established government in

Bucharest would improve considerably, within the limits allowed by the inheritance of a military alliance with a Germany

which although powerful at the beginning of the conflict, it was now on the verge of losing the war.

Keywords: armistice; military alliance; strategic initiative; external policy; volta-face

The years 1943 - 1944 marked the turning point of the Second World War, the United Nations armies

succeeding in taking the strategic initiative on the front, to the detriment of Nazi Germany and its

satellites.

The political and military disaster that Romania was facing would require the reorientation of its external

policy, aiming at bringing the country out of the war as quickly as possible and signing the armistice

(Baciu, 1996, pp. 103-104 & Onisoru, 1996, pp. 49-50). The considerable deterioration of the military

situation on the Eastern Front, embodied by the tireless offensive of the Red Army, would contribute to

the tightening of the relations between the leaders of the main political parties and to the achievement

of the “united opposition”, seeking, through various diplomatic channels, to obtain conditions as

favorable as possible for Romania, for signing the armistice.

The diplomatic action of the opposition benefited from the support of King Mihai, but the peace signing

initiatives were carried out simultaneously also by the Bucharest regime, which, through direct

negotiations with the Allies, pursued the same political goals. In March, the Soviet troops had already

reached the Dniester line in certain sectors, the Romanian authorities being more and more worried

about the increasingly obvious possibility of transforming Romania into a war zone, the attitude

expressing accurately the fears of both the civilian population and the political class. The National

Democratic Bloc (B.N.D.) was established on May 20th, 1944, including the National Peasant Party, the

National Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party and, obviously, for strategic reasons, the Communist

Party of Romania.

As early as May 24th, S.S.I (Secret Intelligence Service) was in possession of an information

memorandum that predicted the status of the Communist Party in the future, given the political influence

of the Soviet Union in the states “liberated” by the Red Army (Onisoru, 1996, pp. 48)2. Considering that

1 Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd., Galati, 800654, Romania, Tel.:

+40372361102, Corresponding author: stefangheorghe@univ-danubius.ro.

2 The political opposition would take shape around the personality of Iuliu Maniu and, as the events precipitate, the king would

become more actively involved in the organization of the opposition, eventually assuming the risk of dismissing and arresting

the marshal.