Romania and the Armistice with the United Nations in International Relations

Author:Stefan Gheorghe
Position:Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania
Pages:474-479
SUMMARY

Romania's changing sides on August 23rd to the United Nations would bring the Romanian state back into the "large team of democratic states" only for a short period of time. The international position of the newly established government in Bucharest would improve considerably, within the limits allowed by the inheritance of a military alliance with a Germany which although powerful at the... (see full summary)

 
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European Integration - Realities and Perspectives. Proceedings 2019
474
Romania and the Armistice with the
United Nations in International Relations
Stefan Gheorghe1
Abstract: Romania’s changing sides on August 23rd to the United Nations would bring the Romanian state back into the “large
team of democratic states” only for a short period of time. The international position of the newly established government in
Bucharest would improve considerably, within the limits allowed by the inheritance of a military alliance with a Germany
which although powerful at the beginning of the conflict, it was now on the verge of losing the war.
Keywords: armistice; military alliance; strategic initiative; external policy; volta-face
The years 1943 - 1944 marked the turning point of the Second World War, the United Nations armies
succeeding in taking the strategic initiative on the front, to the detriment of Nazi Germany and its
satellites.
The political and military disaster that Romania was facing would require the reorientation of its external
policy, aiming at bringing the country out of the war as quickly as possible and signing the armistice
(Baciu, 1996, pp. 103-104 & Onisoru, 1996, pp. 49-50). The considerable deterioration of the military
situation on the Eastern Front, embodied by the tireless offensive of the Red Army, would contribute to
the tightening of the relations between the leaders of the main political parties and to the achievement
of the “united opposition”, seeking, through various diplomatic channels, to obtain conditions as
favorable as possible for Romania, for signing the armistice.
The diplomatic action of the opposition benefited from the support of King Mihai, but the peace signing
initiatives were carried out simultaneously also by the Bucharest regime, which, through direct
negotiations with the Allies, pursued the same political goals. In March, the Soviet troops had already
reached the Dniester line in certain sectors, the Romanian authorities being more and more worried
about the increasingly obvious possibility of transforming Romania into a war zone, the attitude
expressing accurately the fears of both the civilian population and the political class. The National
Democratic Bloc (B.N.D.) was established on May 20th, 1944, including the National Peasant Party, the
National Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party and, obviously, for strategic reasons, the Communist
Party of Romania.
As early as May 24th, S.S.I (Secret Intelligence Service) was in possession of an information
memorandum that predicted the status of the Communist Party in the future, given the political influence
of the Soviet Union in the states “liberated” by the Red Army (Onisoru, 1996, pp. 48)2. Considering that
1 Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd., Galati, 800654, Romania, Tel.:
+40372361102, Corresponding author: stefangheorghe@univ-danubius.ro.
2 The political opposition would take shape around the personality of Iuliu Maniu and, as the events precipitate, the king would
become more actively involved in the organization of the opposition, eventually assuming the risk of dismissing and arresting
the marshal.

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