NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG COUNTERNARCOTICS STAKEHOLDERS IN AFGHANISTAN.

• Author: Ebrahimi, Mohammad Haroon
• Position: Report

Introduction

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) of Afghanistan was established in early 2005 to take a leading role in the development, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of government counternarcotics (CN) strategy (MCN, 2005). According to the Constitution and the Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the MCN plays the leading role in formulating and coordinating programs and policies with line ministries and organizations to combat narcotics and other drugs in Afghanistan. The MCN has developed three policies to target drugs from three different directions: alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, and law enforcement policy (MCN, 2005). Notably, the MCN has established the above policies and other action plans, including a campaign to eradicate cultivated poppy fields, every year through coordination and collaboration with other line ministries and concerned organizations. As the MCN itself lacks the operational capacity and authority to implement these plans and policies, proper coordination and collaboration among line ministries is essential for the successful implementation of CN policies, plans and programs.

Despite numerous efforts to combat drugs in Afghanistan, the cultivation, production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs remains a major challenge to Afghanistan's socioeconomic development. The MCN cannot achieve its goals and objectives without collaborating with other relevant governmental institutions and international agencies. Therefore, the MCN needs to enhance interagency collaboration and coordination, especially with key stakeholders, to effectively incorporate combating drugs into priority programs and to increase operational capacity to implement plans and strategies to achieve the goals of combating drugs and eliminating the cultivation, production, traffic and use of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. To enhance interagency collaboration, the existing patternized interactions in the collaborative process of combating drugs among CN stakeholders in Afghanistan need to be examined.

Notably, this study employs social network analysis to describe the importance and position of each CN stakeholder and the patternized collaborative affiliations among multisectoral actors, including governmental organizations (GOs), international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at different levels and dimensions. These independent actors, which have their own goals and priorities, form networks in order to attain outcomes that they could not achieve alone (Isett et al., 2011, p. i161). To explain the distinct structural and institutional properties of connectedness and interdependency of actors, Provan and Kenis (2008) categorized the governance types of organizational networks into shared governance network, lead organization-governed network, and network administrative organization. Based on this classification, this study seeks to understand the patternized interactions of stakeholders in policy networks regarding seven main counternarcotics activities--i.e., influence in decision making, information and advice seeking, collaboration, resource sharing, funding provision, and goal congruence--and to identify the structure of each network based on the classification created by Provan and Kenis (2008) using a degree centrality measure and degree distributions. That is, the research question of this study is how the structures of the seven types of networks regarding Afghanistan counternarcotics activities relate to this given typology of network types. This paper will subsequently offer mechanisms and policy recommendations to enhance interagency collaboration between the MCN and other stakeholders, allowing them to better lead, collaborate, and coordinate CN activities in Afghanistan.

Interagency collaboration

Greater complexity has made the world smaller, but interconnected problems have increased in such a way that a single organization or, in some cases, even a country, is unable to solve some of them. One such problem is the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Despite government efforts to combat and eliminate drug-related activities in Afghanistan, the cultivation and production of drugs continues to increase. Additionally, we have not seen significant success in combating drugs over the past one and half decades as this multidimensional phenomenon has taken root in Afghanistan, the region and the world. Collaboration among different stakeholders, including regional and international institutions, is crucial in combating this multidimensional phenomenon. Numerous efforts have been made to develop conceptual frameworks guiding the assessment of interagency collaboration in public policy processes (Tseng, 2004). However, the changeability and complexity of studying collaboration, the nature of cooperative efforts, and diverse isotropic regularities make studying collaboration difficult (Knapp, 1995). To improve our understanding of interagency collaboration, interagency operation must first be clarified; that is, interagency operation "involves more than one agency working together in a planned and formal way rather than simply through informal networking (although the latter may support and develop the former). This can be at a strategic or operational level" (Warmington et al., 2004, p. 16). Similarly, interagency collaboration is multidimensional and developmental rather than static. Therefore, it may develop and change. However, considering the area and level at which scholars study interagency collaboration, its definition may also refer to those levels and arenas. For instance, Flynn and Harbin (1987, p. 35) suggested that at the agency level, "interagency collaboration is a general concept that describes a variety of efforts to reform the current categorical service delivery system."

Mattessich et al. (2001, p. 39) defined collaboration as "a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations with a commitment to a set of common goals, a joint structure and shared responsibility, as well as mutual authority and accountability." Multisectoral or multiactor relationships can be maintained based on trust and a shared vision that potentially enhances the ability of the parties to achieve qualitatively better outcomes (Gray, 1989; Huxham, 1996). Other scholars, such as Melaville et al. (1993, p. 20), recognize collaboration as "a series of interrelated activities undertaken by stakeholders through five stages: [1] getting together, [2] building mutual trust, [3] developing a common strategic plan, [4] taking action, and [5] going to scale (i.e., implementing policies on public service delivery)."

Collaborative network structures

There are a variety of collaborative network structures given the different types of involved actors, network boundaries, and the presence or absence of various relational types. Moreover, studies have shown that what a network can achieve is indeed the outcome of its structural form (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Burt, 2005; Cross et al., 2002). Provan and Kenis (2008) define three basic models of network governance: a shared governance network, a lead organization network, and a network administrative organization (NAO). Each of these models varies in its structure. None of these forms appears to be globally dominant; rather, each structure has specific capabilities, which means that each network varies in what it can best accomplish.

In a shared governance network, several administrations work together as a network without a specific governing organization. The administration of cooperative actions remains entirely with the participants in the network (see Figure 1a). In this model, the network members make every decision and control the activities of the network on their own without separate official administrative bodies. However, due to an excess of members in the network, a few members from the network may perform certain coordination and organizational actions.

The strengths of the shared governance form are its adaptability, its ability to act quickly based on member needs, and the inclusion and participation of all the network members. The disadvantage of this model is its moderate inefficiency. This is a form that appears to be perfect for networks that are geographically localized and where members of the network will likely have functional and complete direct participation (Provan & Kenis, 2008). According to Provan and Kenis (2008), shared network governance is most efficient in attaining network-level results when "[1] trust is widely shared among network participants (high-density, decentralized trust), [2] there are relatively few network participants, [3] network-level goal consensus is high, and [4] the need for network-level competencies is low" (ibid., p. 241).

The lead organization model can arise in horizontal multidimensional networks, especially when an organization has enough legitimacy and assets to take the leading role (see Figure 1b). This model primarily arises in state-funded services in which a central service provider with a central location in the network takes the leadership position (Provan & Kenis, 2008). For instance, according to the Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law, the MCN is the lead organization in making policies and coordinating CN activities in Afghanistan. In addition to preserving their own goals, all the affiliates in this network model have a shared purpose; they might also interact and work with each other.

However, one member of the group functions as the leading actor, coordinating every operation and making major decisions. That member administers the network to attain its goals and simplify the activities of the associated groups (Provan & Kenis, 2008). According to Provan and Kenis (2008), to attain network-level results, lead organization network...