Diplomatic, Military and Economic Actions of Romania for the Purpose of Exiting the United Nations War

Author:Stefan Gheorghe
Position:Senior Lecturer, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania
Pages:490-495
European Integration - Realities and Perspectives. Proceedings 2020
490
Diplomatic, Military and Economic
Actions of Romania for the Purpose of Exiting the United Nations War
Stefan Gheorghe1
Abstract: Romania’s entry into war with Germany on June 22nd, 1941, would come after two years of
neutrality and non-belligerence, time when the Romanian external policy direction would be pro-German.
The years 1943 - 1944 marked the turning point of the war development, the United Nations succeeding
in taking the strategic initiative to the detriment of Nazi Germany and its satellites. The political and
military disaster that Romania was facing would require the reorientation of its external policy, aiming at
bringing the country out of the war as quickly as possible and signing the armistice (Baciu, 1996, pp. 103-
104; Onişoru, 1996, pp. 49-50). The considerable deterioration of the military situation on the Eastern
Front, would contribute to the achievement of the “united opposition”, seeking, to obtain conditions as
favorable as possible for Romania, for signing the armistice. The diplomatic action of the opposition
benefited from the support of King Mihai, but the peace signing initiatives were carried out simultaneously
also by the Bucharest regime, which, through direct negotiations with the Allies, pursued the same
political goals.
Keywords: Romanian external policy; United Nations armies; Red Army
The years 1943 - 1944 marked the turning point of the Second World War, the United Nations armies
succeeding in taking the strategic initiative on the front, to the detriment of Nazi Germany and its
satellites. The political and military disaster that Romania was facing would require the reorientation of
its external policy, aiming at bringing the country out of the war as quickly as possible and signing the
armistice (Baciu, 1996, pp. 103-104; Onişoru, 1996, pp. 49-50). The considerable deterioration of the
military situation on the Eastern Front, embodied by the tireless offensive of the Red Army, would
contribute to the tightening of the r elations between the leaders of the main political parties and to the
achievement of the “united opposition”, seeking, through various diplomatic channels, to obtain
conditions as favorable as possible for Romania, for signing the armistice. The diplomatic action of the
opposition benefited from the support of King Mihai, but the peace signing initiatives were carried out
simultaneously also by the Bucharest regime, which, through direct negotiations with the Allies, pursued
the same political goals. In March, the Soviet troops had already reached the Dniester line in certain
sectors, the Romanian authorities being more and more worried about the increasingly obvious
possibility of transforming Romania into a war zone, the attitude expressing accurately the fears of both
the civilian population and the political class. The National Democratic Bloc (B.N.D.) was established
on May 20th, 1944, including the National Peasant Party, the National Liberal Party, the Social
Democratic Party and, obviously, for strategic reasons, the Communist Party of Romania.
1 Senior Lecturer, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd., 800654 Galati, Romania, Tel.:
+40372361102, Fax: +40372361290, Corresponding author: constantin.tanase@univ-danubius.ro.

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