Some reflections on religion and multiculturalism in Romania: towards a reappraisal of the grammar of traditions.

• Author: Rogobete, Silviu E.

Abstract:

This paper discusses the potential of the Christian tradition in Romania to offer a constructive answer to the contemporary dilemmas of multiculturalism. However, for this to happen there is a significant need for a fresh re-reading of this tradition. The starting point of my work will be an overview of the data on the question of religion and ethnicity in post-communist Romania. This will be followed by an assessment of the predominant trends involved in the building of the societal texture of Romanian contemporary society, with special emphasis on attitudes towards authority, otherness and dialogue. The ambiguous potential of traditions, both for destruction and for the healing of societal relations, will be singled out as an important characteristic of traditions. The work will argue for a reappraisal of the Christian tradition and its role, pleading for a fresh re-reading of its complex and pluriformed grammar. Emphasis will be placed on seeing Christianity--and its implicit traditions--as a Religion of Neighbourliness and a Religion of Love, oriented towards the future rather than the past, towards the other rather than the self, inspired by eschatological hope rather than blind allegiance to fixed dogma. Methodologically, my paper will fall in the area of conceptual analysis, partially informed by quantitative analysis and the data available from auxiliary sources

Key words: Multiculturalism, christianity, tradition, orthodoxy.

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1. Religion in Eastern Europe: Against the Prophecies

   The twentieth century, for at least its first seven or eight decades, was undoubtedly marked by a strong sense of suspicion and scepticism towards religion. The so called 'prophets of suspicion' Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, who in some ways marked our modern age in undeletable ways, have not only predicted that, but also prophesised the final end of the age of religion. For all three, in one way or another, with the process of the 'emancipation' of man, one thing was certain: the inevitable and complete fading away of religion from our lives. (1) However, with the passing of time, our current context seems to prove such prediction dramatically wrong. It was wrong at local and global levels, in the West and in the East, in the Northern and in the Southern hemispheres. 9/11 is a proof of the global magnitude as well as of the potentially violent reality of what Anthony Giddens, a more astute interpreter of our times, predicted. Using Freudian language, he announced the return of religion as 'the return of the repressed'. (2)

   That religion is alive and here to stay is identifiable not only in the overall and diffuse 'spirit' of the postmodern age, but also in more precise terms, quantified and reflected in current data offered by various opinion pools. What can be surprisingly noted from such data are the high levels of religiosity scored in areas where, for more than half a century (and even in some places for almost an entire century) the population was under fierce and overt atheist indoctrination. Eastern Europe, particularly Romania, is singled out in the report of the latest findings of the GfK (3) survey on religious attitudes in Europe and the USA (2004). Such data shows that an average of three in four people indicated that they belonged to a religion. At 80 per cent, the number of believers is above average in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, two in three people identified with a specific religion, irrespectively of whether they live in rural or urban areas. The same survey reports that 'the percentage of religious people is particularly high in Romania (97 per cent), Turkey (95 per cent) and Greece (89 per cent). While the majority in Greece (98 per cent) and Romania (88 per cent) belong to the Orthodox Church, almost all people in Turkey stated that they were Muslims.'

   At a national level, as a relevant example, Romania provides us with some unexpected and particularly high levels of religiosity--giving the fact that it has been under one of the most inhumane and repressive regimes during its fifty years of 'cohabitation' with the communist-atheistic ideology. Let us briefly present some of the findings. Religiosity according to the latest National Census in Romania (2002) shows a shocking figure of 99.96 % of the population claiming to belong to an officially recognized religious denomination, while only 0.03 % declaring themselves as atheists and a 0.01 % claiming no religious affiliation. In terms of denominational distribution, the Romanian Orthodox Church has 86.8% of the Romanian population. (4)

   In terms of the trust placed on religion and religious institutions, the church ranks at the top of the Romanians' list, with 86% compared to other institutions, followed by the army with 69%. At the bottom of the list are political parties, the judiciary, the parliament, and the markers of the free market.

   In terms of the daily practice of religion, scores are also very high by any European standards, comparable only with the Catholic Poland. Here is the information relevant to Romania using the same source as above.

   What are the implications of such high levels of religiosity? Is there any potential in such high figures? Moreover, if there is any, is it for good or bad? What conclusions can we trace from such data showing highest levels of trust in Church and Army and lowest in some of the most important institutions related to modern democracy? To answer such questions, let us reflect a little longer on the contemporary situation of the Romanian society and subsequently the place of religion and its afferent tradition.

2. Between Feudalism and (Post)Modernity

   Predominance of National/majority religion

   What constantly came out in the data of various opinion pools for the last fifteen years since the anti-communist revolution, was a striking and significant contrast between, on the one hand, lack of trust in democratic institutions (political parties, justice, government), while on the other, high levels of trust in pre-modern entities (church, army). Some commentators have rightly seen in this a lack of development, a 'deficit of modernity' and thus a form of feudal approach to politics. Characteristics of such politics are an uncritical submission to and longing for strong leadership, lack of individual initiative resting on other higher institutions to provide identity and vision for the future. (5) Within such context, religion and its implied tradition became one of the highest marks of identity, collective and individual alike. To this we shall return later. For the time being, we should note that such attitudes are well seen in reflexes requiring or uncritically accepting, at mass level, high and unjustified state intrusion in and control of the internal affairs of the individual, particularly at the level of his or her religious life. Moreover, Orthodoxy--the majority religion is in a continuous attempt to monopolise the support offered by the state and to limit the presence of other potential rivals to the notion of defining Romanian identity.

   State Control and Manipulation of Religious/ethnic Groups; Legal Issues

   As a relevant example is what elsewhere I called the 'unfinished odyssey of a new Law of religion'. (6) It is a well known and at somehow symptomatic fact that the 'hottest potato' in terms of legislation after the fall of the communist regime in 1989 is the so much disputed new law of religion (Rom. Legea Cultelor Religioase, Egl. 'The Law of Religious Cults'). (7) What should be first mentioned is that to the date of the writing of this present article (February 2006), things are not settled and de facto the law in action is still the highly abusive 'Law of Religious Cults' issued in 1948 by the communist regime. Second, the various proposals for new legislation issued by various governments in the last fifteen years, regardless of the political 'colour' of the legal initiators, represent significant violations of religious freedom and major attempts to discriminate others while favouring the majority group. Since this is relevant within the newer context of the European Union and its implied multiculturalism of which Romania intends to be a part, such issues are worth our extended attention.

   In this regard, I shall exemplify with some information related to the latest version of the Project of Law which is currently being discussed in the Deputies Chamber, after passing unchanged through the Romanian Senate (in December 2005, not by being discussed in the Senate but through a juridical procedural trick) (8). Here are some comments resulted from the review of the above mentioned, latest Project of Law, offered by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. (9) Despite its overall polite tone, the Commission identifies 'certain excessive interferences with the autonomy of the religious communities' which include 'too many imprecise references to other laws. Expressions like "in the conditions of the law" or "according to the law" are frequently used, and without more precise indications, the law becomes subjective leaving far too much space for abuses.'(III.11). Also, the procedures required for the registration of new religious groups include both excessively high levels of quantitative threshold requirements and potentially abusive substantialist interference with the content of the faith/doctrines/ teachings of the newly established religious communities. Some examples will follow:

   * Membership of at least 300 Romanian citizens residing in Romania is needed for a religious association to be registered. This poses two problems: firstly, it may be difficult to fulfil for believers who belong to great religions of the world--as Hinduism or Buddhism--which may not have a great number of followers with Romanian citizenship residing in Romania.

   * Secondly, the citizenship requirement seems at variance with the prohibition of...