Right-wing extremism in France--departmental differences in the vote for the national front.

• Author: Stockemer, Daniel
• Position: Essay

Abstract: Although many studies have addressed the electoral success of right-wing parties and, in particular, the French National Front, no analysis has so far explored departmental differences in the share of votes. This analysis fills this gap by evaluating socio-structural factors and intervening institutional and political variables that have influenced the electoral success of the radical right in the 96 departments of metropolitan France. In this respect, the unemployment rate, crime rate, the degree of urbanization, the electoral system type, the turnout rate as well as the vote share for the moderate right are regressed against the vote share of the National Front. This pooled time series analysis reveals that the degree of urbanization and the turnout rate are the two significant variables accounting for department specific differences in the vote share of the FN.

Keywords: right wing parties, National Front, France, departments, extremism

Introduction

Electoral support for right-wing extremist parties (1) increased in many European countries from the 1980s to the early 2000s allowing these parties to become a significant political force in Western European democracies (Betz 2001: 401). The 2002 contests in France and the Netherlands marked the high point for right-wing extremist support. In the 2002 presidential election in France, electoral support for the National Front candidate, Jean Marie Le Pen contributed to the defeat of Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin. In the Netherlands, following the 2002 parliamentary elections, the anti-immigrant list Pym Fortuyn became the second largest party in the Dutch Parliament and helped form the governing coalition. Similarly, extreme right-wing parties acquired seats in the Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Italian, Norwegian, and Swiss parliaments.

Although there has been no spectacular victory of any extremist party or candidate following Le Pen's coup in 2002, it is still too early to conclude that extremist right wing parties are on their way out. Recently, support for the radical right has dropped in some countries but not in others. In the Netherlands, following the 2006 national election the list Pym Fortuyn is no longer represented in parliament, and in France, the vote share of the FN has considerably declined in the 2006 presidential (from 16,9% in 2002 to 10,75% in 2007) and parliamentary elections (from 11.3% in 2002 to less than 5% in 2007). Yet, in countries such as Austria, the Freedom Party could consolidate its position. Currently, it occupies 11 percent of the seats in the National Assembly of Austria.

The mixed tendencies in radical right wing support reveals that these extremist parties continue to be a thread to democracy. Extremist parties, such as the French National Front, reject universal and egalitarian values and the principles of representative democracy (Mudde 2000: 12). They believe in a natural, harmonious, organic order (e. g., the nation and the family) that is ethically good. Everything (e. g., globalization and ethnic diversity) that breaks this organic order is seen as ethically reprehensible (Rydgren 2004: 10). This political monism, combined with radical, ethnic nationalism, threatens core democratic values of a pluralistic society. The extremist right, embracing elements of populism or, as some scholars claim, neo-fascism (1), also aims at the repression of differences and dissent and the closing down of the market of ideas (Lipset and Raab 1970: 6). Moreover, populist rhetoric incites ethnic violence, and some of the extremist parties engage, at least partly, in historical revisionism. (2) In view of their platforms (3), the far right could also have serious effects on basic human rights and freedoms. (4)

Academics have extensively analyzed the electoral breakthrough and parliamentary progress of the extreme right through case studies (Mayer and Perrineau 1992, Simmons 1996, Holsteyn, 2003, Rydgren 2004) as well as comparative analyses (Beyme 1988, Betz 1994, Carter 2005, Norris 2005). These studies focus almost exclusively on the state level and examine myriad factors including institutional arrangements (such as the electoral system), cultural shifts (such as the emergence of a post-industrialized society), socio-structural features (such as immigration), and political events and developments (such as the convergence of the centre parties).

Intra-country variance in the electoral support for right-wing extremist parties has received only limited attention, even though the spatial distribution of electoral support has varied considerably for parties such as Austria's Freedom Party, Italy's Northern League, Belgium's Flemish Bloc and the French National Front (Jesuit and Mahler, 2004). This spatial unevenness in electoral support deserves closer scrutiny. Critical intra-country variance in the economic conditions, crime rates and the degree of urbanization might explain differences in the electoral success of the far-right wing parties in relatively small geographical entities. Studies that focus exclusively on the state level obscure these differences and provide a simplistic picture.

Intra-country variance in far-right wing support may be more considerable than variance in cross-country support. For example, departmental electoral support for the French National Front in the 2002 presidential election ranged from 5 to over 30 percent. In contrast, the national variance in right-wing support in other European countries with a strong extreme-right stood only between 10 and 16.8 percent for the same period1. In the French context, it is well established that since its first breakthrough in 1984, the FN has drawn disproportionate support in the east of an imaginary Le Havre Valence Perpignan line. Western France until now has appeared more reluctant to support Le Pens party (Gerault 2004). Yet, even in those regions where the vote for the FN is generally high, vast departmental differences occur. For example, in the 2007 presidential election Le Pen received in the region Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, 16.55 percent of the vote in the department Hautes Alpes and 8.92 percent of the suffrages in the department Hautes Alpes.

This study focuses on departmental differences in voting for the French National Front and highlights three socio-economic, two institutional and one political condition that might facilitate the rise of the National Front. The focus of the socio-economic features is on the unemployment rate, the crime rate and the degree of urbanization. According to scholars (e.g., Taguieff and Tribalat 1998, Bihr 1998) and the party platform of the FN favorable economic and structural conditions might explain the rise and long-term success of the FN. In addition, the two institutional factors--the electoral system and the turnout rates--as important intervening variables may reveal whether electoral incentives influence the vote share of this extremist party. Finally, the political factor, the percentage of votes for the moderate right (Union Pour Un Mouvement Populaire), is likely to highlight whether a possible FN voter fluctuates from the moderate to the radical right.

Due to the centralized nature of the fifth French Republic, political factors such as welfare policy, immigration laws, the educational system and employment policy apply to the entire nation. As constants, these policies cannot account for departmental variations in electoral success for the FN. Religious factors should also be irrelevant as France is a relatively secular state where no party (the FN included) emphasizes religion in its platform. Other factors, such as the political climate or the national and international context, may help to explain the electoral success of the FN. For example, a corruption scandal at the national or regional level, involving one or several of the major parties or politicians, might catapult the vote for the FN. Yet, such a scandal should only have short-term effects. Politicians' popularity figures also change quickly over time. Therefore, they are also not a reliable indicator in accounting for long-term trends. The three economic and social conditions, the two intervening institutional variables and the one political factor should therefore offer a sound explanation for why the FN repeatedly receives higher vote shares in some parts of France than in others.

FN activities, such as rallies and campaigning, might also contribute to regional differences in electoral support. However, regional or departmental data on these activities are not available. The FN headquarters keeps regional membership numbers confidential, and in only six regions--Alsace, Franche-Comte, Ile de France, Languedoc, Lorraine, Picardie, and Rhone-Alpes--does the FN have regional websites. These regions are electoral strongholds of the FN, and one can assume an interaction between the popularity of this right-wing party and its political activities and mobilization. Public activity can generate support, which in turn can generate further grass-roots activity. Electoral popularity should attract more members and thus should generate more grassroots activity. However, due to the shortage of reliable data, this analysis cannot include mobilization factors.

The analysis involves a diachronical study of France's 96 metropolitan departments. Departmental differences in the vote share of the Front National will be analyzed over the last 6 elections--the 2002 presidential elections, the 2002 legislative elections, the 2004 European elections, the 2004 regional elections, and the 2007 presidential and legislative elections. The study begins with a short historical overview of the rise of the French National Front in the various parts of France. This will be followed by a cross-departmental evaluation of the 7 different socio-economic institutional and political factors. A regression research design will be used to determine the...