Democratic contributions to un peacekeeping operations. A two-step fuzzy set QCA of Unifil II.

• Author: Haesebrouck, Tim
• Position: POLSCI PAPERS - Qualitative Comparative Analysis - Report

Introduction

Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was reinforced significantly. The EU member states carried the brunt of the burden of this reinforcement. However, while many member states made sizeable personnel contributions, others did not contribute at all. This article aims to explain the pattern of contributions to UNIFIL II. Hereby, it addresses a substantial gap in the academic literature on peacekeeping burden sharing (e.g. Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010). The bulk of the research on the subject consists of empirical tests of collective-action-based models. Scarce studies that do take into account a wider range of conditions almost exclusively focus on international-level determinants. Hereby, the impact of domestic-level conditions remains largely unexamined.

A rare exception to this fixation on external explanations consists in the many studies that establish a link between a states' level of democracy and its propensity to contribute to (UN) peacekeeping operations. Several scholars have posited that democracies are more likely to contribute personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPOs) than non-democracies (e.g. Andersson, 2002; Lebovic, 2004; Victor, 2010: 226). Explanations for this correlation generally build on the normative model of democratic peace: democracies are more inclined to participate in UNPOs because the latter's goal of promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict corresponds to their domestic political norms. More recently however, democratic peace research has emphasized the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, in turn, affects their international behaviour (e.g. Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Ireland and Gartner, 2001). Based on this logic, the domestic differences between democracies can be expected to affect their propensity to contribute to UNPOs. Unfortunately, previous studies have not systematically explored the impact of cross-democratic domestic variation on contributions to UNPOs.

The lack of attention to domestic conditions not only contrasts sharply with recent democratic peace research, but also with studies that build on integrated models to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Bennett et al., 1994). The latter consistently conclude that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. However, such integrated models have been exclusively used to explain diverging contributions to operations conducted by coalitions of the willing or under the aegis of NATO or the EU. In consequence, a structured analysis that links cross-democratic domestic variation to participation in UNPOs, let alone examines the complex interplay between domestic and international conditions, has not yet been produced.

This study aims to fill this gap. It combines international and domestic conditions in an integrated model that aims to explain varying contributions to UNPOs. It focusses on the 2006 reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) because this is one of the few recent UNPOs to which traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions. In consequence, it constitutes a particularly suited case for testing a model that aims to explain varying democratic contributions to UN-peacekeeping. Two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to examine whether the model can explain the varying contributions to this operation. The results of the analysis reveal that personnel contributions to UNIFIL II indeed depend on a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. Contributions are only possible if the absence of military stretch is combined with either a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs or sizeable military capabilities. However, for large contributions to materialize, these international level conditions must be combined with favourable domestic conditions, more specifically with a left-leaning executive that is neither constrained by proximate elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive literature on peacekeeping burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an integrated model that aims to explain diverging contributions to UNPOs. The next section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the operationalization of the condition and the outcome. The third section presents the results of the analysis, before the conclusions recapitulate the study's major findings.

Explaining democratic participation in UN Peacekeeping

I build on three partially overlapping areas of academic research to develop an integrated model for explaining democratic contributions to UNPOs. First, I derive plausible international level explanations from previous research on peacekeeping operations. Subsequently, I draw on democratic peace theory to identify cross-democratic differences that could be relevant for explaining varying contributions to UNPOs. Lastly, I build on integrated decision models to formulate hypotheses on how contribution decisions are produced by specific combinations of international and domestic conditions. Although the resulting framework integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on military burden sharing and democratic peace, it does not incorporate all explanatory variables raised in previous research. Most importantly, the quality of a state's democracy is not included in the framework, since this study aims to explain the contributions of states that adhere to the fundamental standards of democratic governance, any variation above which should be explanatorily irrelevant. In consequence, an assessment of the impact of democratic quality on a state's propensity to participate in UNPO's is beyond the scope of this study.

International level explanations

The rich literature on UN peacekeeping offers a range of plausible international level determinants for contributions to UNPOs. The vast majority of academic research focusses on testing public goods theory (e.g. Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010). Peacekeeping produces a variety of public benefits. At the most general level, UN peacekeeping aims to achieve greater worldwide peace and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless of whether they contribute to operations. A testable implication of the public goods model is that peacekeeping burdens are expected to be shared unevenly. More specifically, because the contributions of larger states are expected to satisfy the amount of peacekeeping desired by smaller states, the former are expected to shoulder a disproportionately large share of the burden of UNPOs (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002: 655; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966).

A number of empirical studies demonstrates that larger states indeed carry a disproportionately large burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming public goods models (e.g. Shimizu and Sandler, 2002; Khanna et al., 1998). Recent research suggests that public benefits are especially important for UN-financed operations, which are expected to be less driven by self-interest than non-UN operations (e.g. Shimizu and Sandler, 2010; Gaibulloev et al., 2009). This is in line with studies that examine the pattern of UN involvement in violent conflicts, which generally conclude this closely reflects the degree to which a conflict poses a threat to international peace and security, not the 'parochial' interests of the members of the UN Security Council (e.g. Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003).

Although empirical tests of public goods models generally focus on financial burden sharing, public goods theory is expected to have explanatory value for personnel contributions to specific operations. More specifically, states without sizeable military capabilities are unlikely to contribute solely to secure public benefits, since they can only hope to have a marginal impact on the total available amount of benefits, which, if public, cannot be denied to them if they do not participate (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 20). Previous research suggests that military capabilities are indeed positively correlated with personnel contributions. In a study of African contributions to peacekeeping operations, Victor (2010: 225), for example, concludes that 'states with larger armed forces tend to deploy more peacekeepers.' Similarly, the study of Bove and Elia (2011: 712) convincingly demonstrates that 'the size of a state's military predicts the contribution to UN peacekeeping.' States with large military capabilities can thus be expected to have an incentive to contribute to secure the public benefits of UNPOs.

While empirical evidence supports public goods models, previous research suggests that two country specific benefits also increase the likelihood and/or size of personnel contributions. First of all, several studies demonstrate that geographic proximity to the target country increases a state's inclination to contribute to a peacekeeping operation (e.g. Bove and Elia, 2011; Perkins and Neumayer, 2008). This correlation can be attributed to the specific benefits peacekeeping produces for states situated closer to a conflict, such as reduced refugee inflows, more secure supply lines, enhanced trade flows following the return of regional stability etc. (Khanna et al., 1998: 182; Shimizu and Sandler, 2002: 656; Shimizu and Sandler, 2010: 1480). Geographic proximity can therefore be expected to provide states an incentive to contribute to UNPOs.

A second contributor specific benefit is the status gained from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna et al., 1998: 182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that invested a large amount of resources to support the UN...